We can no longer afford individual services seeking self-sufficiency.
Let’s take the example of the A-10.
The Air Force would like to retain the A-10 but given the resource constraints mandated by the Congress reducing the Air Force budget, the Air Force must reduce force structure to meet that requirement. After extensive comparative analysis, terminating the A-10 would result in the least impact to the spectrum of capabilities provided by the Air Force.Here.
The Army maintains a very large fleet of Apache helicopters that conduct close air support. The A-10 is a much more capable asset to conduct close air support. So why not retire a part of the Apache force to achieve the same cost savings as retiring the entire A-10 force–that would allow still retaining a significant number of Apaches in the Army–and also retain the more capable A-10 force?
The point is to think across service boundaries in the context of capability, not limit force structure trades inside service stovepipes.
Plain talk. Marine Air Leadership has crawled into bed with SLDInfo in the push to make the Marine Corps more aviation centric. I've screamed, yelled and pounded the table about what I saw as the real goal.
To not only destroy the Marine Air-Ground Team but also to pivot the entire force into a "mini-USAF" across the board.
I think this proves not only that, but also the idea that everything must die to push forward the F-35 AND the idea of an air centric US military posture.
Do me a favor though. Follow the link and read the entire article. Then consider this. Deptula speaks for a large portion of the USAF. Additionally he and SLDInfo throw up trial balloons for policy makers. Think about his proposal. "Retire a portion of the Apache force to allow retaining the A-10"? If I'm wrong about everything else, I'm spot on about the budget wars beginning.