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| U.S. Marines with 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (AABn.), 2d Marine Division, conduct a mechanized amphibious egress exercise on Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 22, 2021. This training strengthened the unit’s capacity to conduct amphibious training in the Atlantic while ensuring safety of operations. |
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| U.S. Marines from with 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, load High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems on an Australian Defence Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft with 36th Squadron during a HIMARS Rapid Infiltration as a part of Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 in Bundaberg, Queensland, Australia, July 24, 2021. This is the ninth iteration of Talisman Sabre, a large-scale, bilateral military exercise between Australia and the U.S. involving more than 17,000 participants from seven nations. The month-long multi-domain exercise consists of a series of training events that reinforce the strong U.S./Australian alliance and demonstrate the U.S. military’s unwavering commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. |
via Global Times
The US has been instigating its allies to stir up trouble in the South China Sea in recent years. This article by the Washington Examiner is even more blatant in urging Britain to send a warship within 12 miles of Chinese territories. It can be concluded that the US is the biggest destroyer of peace and stability in the South China Sea.
The term "special relationship" was coined by former prime minister Winston Churchill after WWII. And it has been used to describe the unique alliance between the US and Britain. In recent years, some analysts have questioned whether their "special relationship" could continue.
US President Joe Biden chose the UK as the destination of his first overseas trip, and he issued a statement pledging to affirm the "special relationship" with the UK when he met Johnson in June. This embodies the US' intention to strengthen its "special relationship" with Britain. When the US sees China as its top rival, it is roping in all its allies, including the UK, to counter China.
From the perspective of the UK, after Brexit, the country hopes to increase its influence on global affairs by leveraging its special relations with the US. London has more pressing needs to underline its "special relationship" with Washington, and London's strategic demand for the US is rising.
"Against this backdrop, the US has the initiative. As a result, how special US-UK relations are depends on Britain's performance. Washington also intends to exploit London as cannon fodder to test China's reaction," Wang Yiwei, director of the institute of international affairs at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, told the Global Times.
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| U.S. Marines with the All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, leap from a CH-53E Super Stallion assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 11th MEU, during helocast training at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, July 15, 2021. Helocasting is a method for quick and efficient entry into the water from a helicopter, during amphibious operations. |
📽️It's about speed and agility...#RoyalMarines have been testing lightweight vehicles for rapid movement across the battlefield, as commandos look to add extra mobility for raiding missions that are increasingly a focus of the UK's Commando Forces.https://t.co/lBXb2LdqrG pic.twitter.com/TFIBZbHEO3
— Royal Marines (@RoyalMarines) July 23, 2021
PLA's new MLRS.
— The Dead District (@TheDeadDistrict) July 24, 2021
Does anybody know designation?#PLA #China #MLRS pic.twitter.com/K78YOlCqSC
via 19fortyfive
The trouble with this acquisition strategy is that the Sea Services look like they are going all in for LAW, even though it appears to be flawed both technically and operationally. At 14 knots, LAW will be a slow ship. It would take one to two weeks to make the trip from Hawaii to the first island chain, even if it had the range. Being slow also means that if detected, it would have little chance of evading attack or, lacking adequate armaments, of defending itself. With respect to self-defense, LAW would be vulnerable to mine warfare when approaching the shore.
Supporters argue that because it is relatively small and slow, and able to use its shallow draft to land on unguarded beaches, LAW will be able to avoid detection by hiding among the great number of small cargo and fishing vessels that operate in the littoral waters of the Indo-Pacific theater. This assumes that most of these vessels will not run for cover when war breaks out.
The LAW operating concept also fails to appreciate how rapidly surveillance technologies of all kinds are proliferating in the region. Over the next decade, China may be capable of creating a robust network of surveillance assets and supporting analytics to find, fix and target ships as small as LAW. There is no worse combination of attributes when it comes to the survivability of warships than slow and visible.
