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| PACIFIC OCEAN (June 9, 2012) Sgt. Brenden Grace, assigned to the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU), demonstrates to Lt. j.g. Stephen Logan how to properly handle an M4 rifle on the aircraft elevator of the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) during weapons familiarization training. Makin Island and embarked Marines assigned to the 11th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet Area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dominique Pineiro/Released) |
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| Lockheed Martin test pilot Al Norman was at the controls for the first flight of F-35A AF-19 on 9 June 2012 at NAS Fort Worth JRB. |
To bypass these chokepoints, the wargamers experimented with a concept called "seabasing," putting an entire Army Stryker brigade afloat on ships and then landing them at minor harbors -- fishing villages, for example -- or even bare beaches without ever going through the ports. In some ways it was a 21st century version of the D-Day landings 68 years ago, albeit with much smaller forces going much longer distances. Army leaders were excited about the idea, but the actual players struggled with how to implement it. Unlike some past simulations, this year's wargame didn't handwave the logistical difficulties of such an operation or postulate future technologies that would somehow make the problem go away.Notice whats at work here?
"This time they forced us to only play capabilities that are in the current [budget] program, which added a good dose of reality," said one participant, who asked to remain anonymous. Today, for example, the US military flies personnel overseas and only sends their equipment and supplies by sea, which means it has few ships designed to accommodate large numbers of troops. So the wargamers improvised by chartering two civilian cruise liners. They also had to hire civilian vessels to carry some supplies; that proved a problem when the simulated enemy mined the sea lanes, scaring some commercial transports into turning around without making key deliveries - something military crews would not have done.
The wargame also showed a bottleneck in the ability to get troops from the transport ships to shore without going through the easily targeted major ports. To unload from the big seagoing ships onto small landing craft while both are out at sea, the military relies on something called a Mobile Landing Platform, a kind of floating, self-propelled pier that can serve as a port facility in mid-ocean. The problem, the same participant said, is that "there's only three mobile landing platforms that are currently resourced" in long-term budget plans, and some of them were needed in a second simulated conflict underway at the same time in the Pacific. "We had to fight for those to enable the seabase," he said.
So while seabasing is a neat idea, it turns out the Army needs more ships of specific types, such as those Mobile Landing Platforms, in order to implement it. But those additional ships aren't only not in the current budget plan: They would never be in the Army's part of the budget at all. Like long-range cargo planes, seabasing is something the Army has to beg its sister services to buy so they can get it to the fight. That's not a happy fact for the Army to encounter, but it's a lot better to encounter it in simulation than in a real shooting war where it's too late to fix anything.
"One of the great challenges is being honest with yourself: You have to actually identify what you can do and where you have real difficulty -- and that is happening," said a civilian participant. "The thing is, we have to be very clear now. The stakes are much higher from both a bureaucratic and strategic sense... Right now DoD [the Department of Defense] is making hard choices about what capabilities they have to invest in and what capabilities they feel can take some risk in, [and] it's very important that the Army test their real demands pretty hard before DoD makes any of their choices permanent."
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| U.S. Marines with Golf Battery, 2nd Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment
(2/10) set up security and await an Explosive Ordinance Disposal team
during a patrol through local Afghan settlements in Habbib Abad,
Afghanistan, May 28, 2012. 2/10 conducted the patrol to interact with
and record data from the local population of Boldak, in support of the
International Security Assistance Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Robert Reeves) |
While the examples you cite do indeed separate generations, the divide is cultural and not necessarily age-related. In fact, one could point to long periods of peace and then periods of war as having formed those generations, irrespective of the specific duration of each periods.Now re-read the article by Haynie.
No, the generation gap (the “Old Corps” always ended the day before you came in) is not the problem. Peacetime militaries become bureaucratic, because the can, and not pay a high price. Until some supply sergeant is making soldier sign for ammunition while the Zulus are massacring 24th Foot at Isandlwana.
The younger generation earns the respect of the older one by performing to an established standard. Upholding the good name of the unit. Traditions of things endured and things accomplished, such as regiments had down forever, as it were.
Those young Marines are magnificent. As good as any who assaulted through objectives with M-1 in hand. Micromanaging, and zero-defects, and stifling of new ideas are not generation-dependent. They are the result of a culture that has lost its focus on what is important. Training to fight and win wars against our nation’s adversaries. That is a lot more important than perceived “generational conflict”.
When we bend the armed forces to accommodate raising families, sabbaticals, non-military related educational opportunities, and journeys of self-discovery, we are as lost in our focus as are those who think we need Cinderella liberty at fleet week and breathalyzers in the workplace.
As a LtCol, I walked patrols with PFCs who were not even born when I joined the Corps. And we had a Chief Corpsman who could draw on his IRA without penalty. So your assumption isn’t correct.
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| U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF OPERATIONS (June 9, 2012) The amphibious transport dock ship USS New York (LPD 21), left, transits alongside the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65). New York was commissioned in November 2009 and is currently on its maiden deployment, while Enterprise was commissioned in November 1961 and is on its 22nd and final deployment after more than 50 years of service. Both ships are currently deployed to the region in support of maritime security operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Scott Pittman/Released) 120609-N-FI736-409 |
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| General Dynamics Europe has "civilianized" the EAGLE...You can bet they want to do the same in the US...especially if they win the JLTV contract. |
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| Iveco wants to build on the VBTR's win in Brazil...Argentina just procured some a few months ago and it will probably be offered as competition against the Piranha III...especially since the bigger and heavier Piranha V has yet to gain traction |
Mercenaries and foreign fighters could replace British soldiers when Army numbers are slashed by 20,000, it was announced yesterday.Those are some pretty good units too.
Legendary infantry units could also disappear as Defence Secretary Philip Hammond admitted yesterday that “difficult decisions” will have to be made.
He warned: “Some units inevitably will be lost or will merge.”
As the Army prepares to reduce from 102,000 soldiers to just 82,000, the Mirror understands 5 Rifles, The Coldstream Guards, 3 Mercian and 2 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers are among those facing the axe.
All have recently lost men in battle against the Taliban or Iraqi insurgents and have played key military roles since 9/11.
Mr Hammond yesterday conceded that cuts would mean greater use of reserves and private contractors.
And he said Britain would have to look to its Nato allies to provide future military support.
But last night Shadow Defence Secretary Jim Murphy branded the moves “perverse” and “self-defeating.”
He said: “Mr Hammond has increased uncertainty where clarity was needed
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| Marines with 3d Marine Special Operations Battalion, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, conduct predeployment training in South Carolina., May 22 to 24. During the training the Marines conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. |
Wow.
JORDAN — Marines with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Maritime Raid Force, composed largely of its Force Reconnaissance Platoon, went straight to work showing off their capabilities upon landing in the Jordanian desert in preparation for Exercise Eager Lion 12, May 7. The MRF took part in an international military warrior competition at Jordan’s King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center and immediately crossed the country to meet with members of the Jordanian 77th Marine Reconnaissance Battalion. They spent the following days sharing experiences and refining each other’s skills. Eager Lion 12 is an international training exercise with more than 19 countries and approximately 11,000 participants designed to promote cooperation and military-to-military relationships among participating forces. The exercise scenario is intended to portray realistic, modern-day security challenges. Working with the Jordanians has allowed the MRF to return to the basics of shooting while also allowing them the opportunity to refine their knowledge of special operations mission capabilities through teaching. The Marines taught classes on their sniper rifles: the M40A5, M110 semi-automatic sniper system, and M107 .50 cal. Special Application Scoped Rifle, or SASR. Further scheduled training includes rappelling, fast roping, and ship takedown drills. Marines who become part of the reconnaissance community must undergo rigorous training and screening before becoming Force Reconnaissance. Once part of a unit, they attend a myriad of different schools in order to learn the abilities necessary for the unit to be self-sufficient. This added expertise allows a Force Reconnaissance platoon to be capable of several special missions: ship takedowns, long-term reconnaissance, battlefield shaping, counterintelligence and quick reaction, small-scale raids among others. “We train with special operations partners in joint training missions to facilitate possible missions in the future,” said Capt. Patrick R. Madden, the 24th MEU’s MRF commander. But the MRF is much more than just Force Reconnaissance Marines. It relies on several attached assets to complement its diverse skill sets. “Intelligence personnel have been integrated into the unit,” said Madden. “They can immediately detain and process a detainee on site without having to send them somewhere else. Trained personnel can also provide a full spectrum of signal intelligence detection and counter detection.” These additional assets include Marines from human intelligence, signal intelligence, fire support control, and explosive ordnance disposal. “We have many of the same assets internal to a special operations unit,” said Staff Sgt. Zachary Burghart, an MRF team leader. “We do a lot of the same special missions that Special Forces do, but we do it specifically for the task force commander or the MEU commander.” This attachment to a larger unit, like the 24th MEU, allows the Marines the ability to take the initiative in a situation while still having a much larger force backing them. “By having a smaller force, there are many advantages,” said Burghart. “We can maintain the initiative longer when we move in and get on top of a unit; we have a smaller footprint ashore, we are more flexible when the mission changes, we require fewer capabilities to move ashore, and we provide a more precise outcome.” All these advantages allow the MRF to move quickly ashore, accomplish the mission with minimal delay, and adapt as the mission changes. “You don’t get mired down in the situation, which allows us to be more efficient,” said Madden. But there are disadvantages with a parent unit relying solely on the MRF. While a lighter load allows them to move quickly, they need resupplies for time-extended missions. MEU assets allow the Marines to sustain indefinitely and also provide a quick reaction force should the MRF need more fire in a fight. “Everybody has their part and we enable the MEU a special mission operability,” said Madden. “With EOD or human intelligence or any the assets internal to our platoon, we adapt easily to changes in a mission.” The ability to gather, process and react to new information grants the MRF a unique flexibility. “We are a self-contained unit with all the organic elements needed to be self-sufficient and directly act upon any intelligence gathered in the field,” said Petty Officer 1st Class Lee Boujie, special amphibious reconnaissance corpsman. “There are so many skill sets in this unit, it’s ridiculous. The amount of knowledge, skills and abilities in this unit allows us to do more with less.” The small unit’s abilities provide but one of the many components of the 24th MEU. But it’s these quick reaction special mission capabilities that set them apart and make them an essential and oftentimes first piece of the big picture.
This is reallya blessing in disguise.The revolutionary Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which has taken 12 years to plan and already cost £45 million, would have allowed ships tracking a low-flying jet or missile to pass the data to the targeted vessel, allowing it to launch defensive missiles, or for them to be launched by remote control.The decision was criticised by a Navy commander who said it could mean placing the new billion-pound aircraft carriers in harm’s way. “The Navy knows savings have to be made, but the Forces have been asked to do more with less,” said a Navy commander.“Furthermore, with the coastal environment being the one more likely to operate in during future conflicts you need to have as much reaction time as possible if you’re putting £1 billion ships in harm’s way.”The system is vital because enemy warships and incoming missiles can sometimes be masked by hilly coastal areas — such as in the Falklands, where the terrain of San Carlos Water meant that an incoming Exocet would not have been seen before it was too late.With CEC, a destroyer further out to sea could follow the missile’s track then fire the threatened warship’s defensive missiles by remote control. As early as January this year Peter Luff, the defence equipment minister, told Parliament that CEC would be fitted to the £1 billion Type 45 destroyers in 2018 and then the estimated 13 future Type 26 Global Combat Ships. The system would cost just £24 million to defend each ship.
