I highlighted parts of Barrack's article to show how jacked up Berger's force design 2030 is, why its failing so badly and why its bringing such organizational chaos to the force. Re-read the article then circle back here.
But doing so requires open communication about the designs and an effective means to gain institutional buy-in. Since the commandant appears to have lost the support of a large cadre of retired Marine generals, something clearly went off the rails.
Berger might be a change agent (a poor one) but he's also demonstrated himself to be a poor leader. A leader will get buy-in from those he leads. He just tried to ram this thru.
Possibly the force design’s most controversial aspect is the commandant’s near-singular focus on enabling sea denial in a naval expeditionary campaign. This stems from then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis’ designation of China as the “pacing threat.”
This is the most puzzling piece of this force design drama. Mattis signed onto the letter stating that Berger has gone too far and is leading the former Marine Corps into a bad direction.
NO ONE is making note of this! The man that supposedly made the decision behind this dramatic change DOES NOT support it!
The commandant’s emphasis on stand-in forces as a force defining concept contributes to these concerns. Just as China is the pacing threat, stand-in forces is the pacing concept. In essence, stand-in forces are small, low-observable units which operate within range of an adversary’s sensors and weapons in order to enable operations and complicate the adversary’s plans. Yet “crisis response” is not even mentioned in the concept.
Berger has been focused on the stand-in-force concept with the dedication of a crack addict chasing his next fix. He abandoned the roles of 9-1-1 force, crisis response force and amphibious assault completely after this thing rolled out.
Now? Now his minions are trying to convince people that its still applicable. No one believes it and I don't think the mouth pieces believe it themselves.
Damage control is in full effect.
The Marine Corps needs to clarify its roles in contingencies beyond China and in warfighting concepts beyond that of stand-in forces. Of particular importance to Marine identity is to clarify how the service contributes to offensive operations. Since the concept of stand-in forces is specifically defensive — it makes no claim otherwise — then what concept guides the Marine Corps in the offense?
Specifically defensive. For better or worse that is not the American way of war. We are an attacking force (not stating that's a good thing...just that it IS a thing).
This is why I believe if Berger is to get his way then fine...just rebrand the Marine Corps into a Coastal Defense Force...rip it down even further and put it in the same box as the Navy has its NECC.
A professional discourse on innovation, warfighting, and roles and missions is warranted to ensure the Marine Corps remains “ready to fight.” To wait until consensus or clarity, though, is to impose paralysis on innovation and adaptation.
This part has me punching walls.
Change Agent 101 says that you don't start till you have a vision of what the organization will look like at the end.
Berger and company isn't doing that.
They're trying to do this on the fly. THAT IS A RECIPE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL DYSFUNCTION! That is how you end up with organizational failure.
I'm assuming that all these colonels and generals know this but they're making basic mistakes that defy understanding.
They got no buy in. They're alienating some of their biggest supporters. They have diluted the brand that they say they love and have served in damn near a lifetime.
Perhaps most importantly they're diminishing the role of their organization in its field (warfighting) and instead making it a niche force that is useless except in one area of the world.
