SNAFU!

Sunday, March 06, 2011

Golan MRAP...why didn't it succeed?

I'm looking back at the history of the MRAP program and one vehicle keeps popping up as "looking" like a winner yet failing to gain substantial orders. The Golan.

Does anyone have specific information on why it wasn't chosen and why the manufacturer failed to seek sales elsewhere? It would be appreciated.

Sunday's Must Read..."The ARG at the Vortex of Change"

Second Line of Defense writes....

Lessons Learned From Operation El Dorado Canyon
During Operation El Dorado Canyon in Libya in the late 1980s, the United States conducted a strike against the Libyan government in response to the state-sponsored bombing of a disco in Berlin that resulted in the injury of over 200 people, and cost the lives of two individuals. Much of the accolades that followed the successful raids on Libya revolved around the long-range, EF-111 and FB-111 bombers, along with the KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft that conducted long-range refueling operations while originating operations out of the United Kingdom.
Less talked about was the role of the Naval Forces off the coast of Libya that also participated in the raids. Well over 30 Naval strike aircraft participated in the raids as well, and the Naval Force was also on stand-by to conduct search and rescue operations as needed with helo-borne forces. The Naval Fleet provided command and Control as well, and the security of the airspace was guaranteed through the use of carrier-based F-14 Tomcats that were in position to react should something arise.

What is more important is what did not take place. Had there been an unforeseen emergent air threat that resulted in significant delays, the bomber force that had transited the Atlantic would have been unable adjust to the extended operations, and would likely have had to turn back toward England without dropping their ordnance. In an equivalent scenario in today’s day and age, that would most certainly be viewed as a strategic failure and then subsequently be plastered all over the mass media as exactly that.

What is more important is what did not take place. Had there been an unforeseen emergent air threat that resulted in significant delays, the bomber force that had transited the Atlantic would have been unable adjust to the extended operations, and would likely have had to turn back toward England without dropping their ordnance.

What the Naval Services provided operational commanders during Operation El Dorado Canyon is exactly the same thing the ARG provides today– the ability to react to change and absorb operational friction across a spectrum of operational conditions. That is something that typically doesn’t make the history books. Instead of a single-focus, long-range strike capability, the USN-USMC team provides operational commanders with a series of strategic, operational and tactical options that a one-dimensional bomber force cannot provide.