Monday, August 08, 2011
Monday Humor. You're a Ranger...so what?
This photo has me cracking up!
I don't know what the little girl is saying but either she's talking pure dee trash to those Ranger Instructors or she has one heck of a command presence.
Either way its a great pic!
Sunday, August 07, 2011
Operation Iron Snare. Deadbeats get got.
Wow.
Ya know, the big guy with the bullet proof vest on under his t-shirt should have been a clue that something was going on.
Hasik gets it wrong.
Big Time Hat Tip to Jonathan for sending me this article!
Hasik is a defense analyst with a big following inside the beltway. He's one of the 'inside' guys so I was surprised by how wrong he was in his latest analysis of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program. Read his entire post here, but a tidbit....
Rather, the general was describing two possible ways forward after the EFV:1. A landing force carried entirely in ACVs.My opinion, but Hasik is missing the real debate here.
2. A mix of ACVs and wheeled vehicles, with the latter borne by hovercraft or displacement landing craft.
So, there's no exotic two-part vehicle under consideration, and as I suggested yesterday was possible. Indeed, the second option—the two-parter, it would seem—is actually a rather tried-and-true approach. Plenty of other amphibious forces have amphibious tractors (usually AAV7s from BAE Systems) and hovercraft (often from Griffon), and those that don't definitely know how to drive ashore in landing craft with bow ramps.
This merely reinforces my assertion yesterday about the competitive way forward for industry, though I will extend my remarks slightly:
First, the Navy's follow-on hovercraft, the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC), should have a secure future. If one really wants to stand over the horizon for an amphibious assault, helicopters and hovercraft are the technically proven way to do it. Hovercraft admittedly aren't as robust under fire as AAVs, but then again, neither are helicopters. And, with both helicopters and hovercraft, the assault force can have options for going where the enemy isn't.
Second, the emphasis on wheeled vehicles, hauled ashore by SSCs or displacement landing craft, means that the Marine Personnel Carrier program will likely continue in the Corps's plans. After all, the Marines had mostly been thinking about proven designs—Nexter's VBCI, ARTEC's Boxer, GD's LAV-V, and Patria's AMV—with modifications for their particular requirements. Those are reasonably priced vehicles whose long-term costs are well-established. They're not EFVs or GCVs, so there's no reason to get worked up a priori about affordability.
1. The ACV is going forward. The Marines will have a follow on to the AAV.
2. The proposal to have a mixed force arose because the EFV was so expensive.
3. With the EFV canceled and the ACV replacing it, the idea of a mixed force loses its luster. The Marine Corps has in essence placed the Marine Personnel Vehicle on hold until studies can be determined as to whether it makes sense to purchase two vehicles instead of one.
4. His attempt to link the SSC to future amphibious assault doctrine is a misnomer. In no plans have I read that the SSC will be used in the assault phase. He can compare the survivability of the SSC to aircraft but there is no comparison. The SSC is a relative sitting duck.
5. He goes on to make the statement that the Marines might be interested in a high speed LCVP for landing personnel. Not bloody likely. The Marines are tailoring themselves as the medium weight force of the US. Buying high speed LCVPs would put us in the role of Commandos. It ain't happening.
In all I'm just disappointed but not surprised. Naval analyst usually have a hard time with Marine Corps issues. What is annoying is that he and others like him have the ear of policy makers. And that is a club that has benefits and no entry without membership. And thats the shame of it.
Unless the Marine Corps gets its message out then those that don't know it, don't understand it or purposefully want to misrepresent it are going to be heard.
We can't let that happen.
Saturday, August 06, 2011
More photos from Summer Storm 2011.
All photos by Staff Sergeant Dwight Henderson
Chinook shoot down historical perspective.
Major league hat tip to Grand Logistics Blog for this ... via the Guardian UK...as always read it all but this tidbit should stir some fire...
It means that I'm a homer for all things USA.
Apple pie, the red white and blue....hot dogs...Ford trucks...etc....
But I'm not stupid either.
The US Military and the DoD in particular will cover up facts that will either...cause alarm to the public...cause the public to question the war....or cause the political class to lose even more favor.
All three of these apply with the latest shoot down. I said earlier that I doubted that our guys would fly into RPG ambushes. Lex called it even more precisely and stated flat out that it had to be an anti-air missile. Now we have Grand Logistics bringing this article to our attention.
Long story short.
The Taliban have anti-air missiles and our helo forces need to change tactics to account for that fact.
The US military covered up a reported surface-to-air missile strike by the Taliban that shot down a Chinook helicopter over Helmand in 2007 and killed seven soldiers, including a British military photographer, the war logs show.What does all this mean?
The strike on the twin-rotor helicopter shows the Taliban enjoyed sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities earlier than previously thought, casting new light on the battle for the skies over Afghanistan.
Hundreds of files detail the efforts of insurgents, who have no aircraft, to shoot down western warplanes. The war logs detail at least 10 near-misses by missiles in four years against coalition aircraft, one while refuelling at 11,000ft and another involving a suspected Stinger missile of the kind supplied by the CIA to Afghan rebels in the 1980s.
But if American and British commanders were worried about the missile threat, they downplayed it in public – to the extent of ignoring their own pilots' testimony. The CH-47 Chinook was shot down on 30 May 2007 after dropping troops at the strategic Kajaki dam in Helmand where the British were leading an anti-Taliban drive. Witnesses reported that a missile struck the left rear engine of the aircraft, causing it to burst into flames and nosedive into the ground. All on board died, including 28-year-old Corporal Mike Gilyeat of the Royal Military Police.
It means that I'm a homer for all things USA.
Apple pie, the red white and blue....hot dogs...Ford trucks...etc....
But I'm not stupid either.
The US Military and the DoD in particular will cover up facts that will either...cause alarm to the public...cause the public to question the war....or cause the political class to lose even more favor.
All three of these apply with the latest shoot down. I said earlier that I doubted that our guys would fly into RPG ambushes. Lex called it even more precisely and stated flat out that it had to be an anti-air missile. Now we have Grand Logistics bringing this article to our attention.
Long story short.
The Taliban have anti-air missiles and our helo forces need to change tactics to account for that fact.
A tier one unit lost.
I'm back to the Chinook shoot down.
The strategic implications are shocking. One of our two, tier 1 Special Operations Units has been decimated in a single attack.
They will reconstitute.
The military always does.
But it does make you wonder about how we operate now. Additionally, I would assume that the Afghan Special Ops people were some of the best that they had produced so we have a one two punch here.
Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha now assumes the lead.
Good luck guys.
22nd MEU at Summer Storm 2011 training with Romanian Marines.
All photos by Staff Sergeant Dwight Henderson.
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