Your Sunday Matinee...Power Unlimited...

I love these old historical/propaganda/I love America and her military...type movies.  Via Scoop Deck...great find..

8 bladed C-130...

A C-130H3 with eight-bladed NP 2000 propellers taxis during a flight test recently at Edwards AFB, Calif. The NP 2000 props are designed to provide more thrust and perform more efficiently. (Air Force photo/John Perry)

Loren Thompson gets the truth out about the latest F-35 "slandering"

This from the esteemed Loren Thompson....

Pentagon Factional Disputes Are A Key Driver Of F-35 Cost Increases

Author:

Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

Date:

Friday, November 5, 2010

Tags:

Bloomberg Business News, F-35

When the Pentagon released its latest cost estimates for the tri-service F-35 joint strike fighter program, many outsiders were aghast at the projected price-tag for the planes. Everyone knew it was the defense department's biggest development program, but the per-plane costs were a good deal higher than most people were expecting. Now Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg Business News is reporting that acquisition costs could go even higher due to development delays -- only a few months after policymakers restructured the program, supposedly to put it on a more predictable, executable path. So this program must be really fouled up, right?

Wrong. The same Pentagon report that disclosed the high cost projections also stated that all three variants of the plane were meeting key performance requirements and doing well in tests. It also said no major design or engineering concerns had been identified in any of the variants. That is still the case today. Minor engineering issues arise the same way they would in any other cutting-edge technology project, and software is taking longer than expected to generate and test, just as it seems to in every other new weapons program. But the F-35 program is basically in good shape. So why is there an endless drumbeat of bad news about the program's schedule and cost?
The biggest reason, a reason few outsiders seem to grasp, is bureaucratic politics in the Pentagon. You see, there are these factions that benefit from generating cost estimates, conducting tests and doing other things associated with new weapons programs, and said factions tend to make the usual problems any development program encounters either look worse or actually be worse. Take the cost estimates. Prime contractor Lockheed Martin has recently signed the fourth consecutive production contract with the defense department in which the actual cost of building the F-35 came in well below the cost projected by Pentagon estimators. About 25 percent below, in the latest contract. Yet cost estimators continue to apply pessimistic assumptions to projecting future costs, based on historical data from other, older fighter programs. So they come up with wildly wrong cost estimates that the contractor beats every time. It has to beat them, because nobody is going to buy a single-engine fighter for much more than what the latest F-16 sells for today, so that's how Lockheed needs to price the new plane.
Or take the possible development delays that reporter Capaccio of Bloomberg revealed. Most of those delays, if they occur, won't be caused by internal program problems. They will be caused by the desire of the Pentagon's testing community to conduct a vast array of redundant flight tests -- literally thousands of them. Why? Because that's what testers do. So now there's an internal dispute between the testers and budget planners about just how many tests are really needed, and if the testers prevail the cost of the program could go up by billions of dollars. It's ironic that acquisition functions funded by Congress to enhance program performance have the perverse effect of inflating costs and delaying fielding, but that's why the term "bureaucratic politics" was invented. When you create an office in the government, it's natural tendency is to grow in size and influence (look at EPA). It's up to Congress to decide when these offices cease to add value, but in the meantime let's not blame industry or the military services for all the unpleasant surprises.
Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.

Funny how those who should know about things like this failed to report them. 

Funny how certain knowledge is always left out of this debate...

Remember the dust up over the F-35's range in comparison to legacy fighters????  Remember what was left out of that discussion by the critics of the F-35???

The fact that the F-35 will outrange the vaunted (and capable) F-22!  One author even went so far as to suggest that the Harrier was superior to the F-35B in range!

All I ask from those that are critics is to be honest.  Spin and sophistry (as one noted critic likes to put it) should not be a part of this discussion.

Loren Thompson has put a knife in the latest dustup....hopefully others will do the same in the future.

Town Hall Meeting by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

First flight of the X-35 A - B - C!

Another awesome photographer....

If you like Harriers then you must check out PhoenixFlyer2008's Flickr stream....looks like Joe Stremph finally has some worthy competition which is great for us all....

The United States Marine Corps...Every Clime and Place...

Bravo 18 AKM

Tactical-Life has a write up on the Bravo 18 AKM.  Does anyone have info on this gun?  I did the standard Google search and could find nothing on the company Bravo 18 Incorporated.  If you have a heads up, then send it this way!

Well said Sir!

via Marine Times....

The United Kingdom’s recent decision to drastically cut its military, including a decision not to purchase the jump-jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter [“Analysts: U.K. move to drop F-35B won’t raise costs,” Nov. 1], holds a lesson for our own similarly challenging economic times.

Britain’s fleet once policed the seas and now tries to keep afloat a token measure of their past maritime dominance. Their decisions make near-term fiscal sense, but cut at the quick of their national military capability. We are faced with many of these same, tempting cost-cutting decisions, and we’d be well-served to make our decisions aligned with long-term strategic interests, rather than current financials.

As Marines, we pride ourselves on being most ready when the nation is least, but no longer can that readiness be defined inexpensively by a full canteen, bandoleer and Army hand-me-downs. Nine years at war and casualties have changed that ultra low-cost “have gun, will travel” construct. Today, the nation requires the Corps to fill a band of military requirements short of the Army, but more robust than the exquisite skills of the U.S. Special Operations Command community. We prevent conflict with our forward-deployed presence and, if needed, we buy time for follow-on forces to arrive or negotiation to begin. To fill that middleweight-fighter requirement, the Corps must retain its essential character as an expeditionary air-ground general purpose force — a force with a fighting weight exceeding the sum of its pounds.

Beyond our bedrock requirement for amphibious shipping, we are not beholden to any single program, but our young Marines need the capabilities resident in certain platforms to safeguard lives and prevail in conflict. The short-take-off-and-vertical-landing JSF, MV-22 Osprey and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle are not inexpensive, but are a value when compared to the lives they will save and the operational flexibility they will provide. They are an investment in our children’s future, a hedge against the arc of history and the necessary premium of peace to prevent the terrible cost of war.

Col. Bryan Salas, director of public affairs
Headquarters Marine Corps

A modest proposal. Time to say good-bye to Tanks.

It pains me to say this.

I don't like having to say this.

But the facts are plain and have been for the past 10 years.

The USMC can no longer afford the luxury of having tanks.  Farm it out to the US Army and have them establish detachments aboard USMC bases....have the Army provide the logistics support --- but get the burden off the Marine Corps.

Just a few intense facts...

1.  Marine Corps tanks haven't deployed to Afghanistan.
2.  Distributed Operations (at least as I've read it) doesn't account for tanks in its doctrine.
3.  The Marine Corps is attempting to become more expeditionary.  Tanks don't allow for that luxury and even in the best case scenario would be relegated to Division or higher.
4.  Tanks are a tremendous burden to the MEU.
5.  The MEU could deploy more AAVs/EFVs/JLTVs, howitzers, MTVRs etc...if it didn't have the burden of having a tank platoon attached.


There are many more reasons that others could come up with I'm sure.  But the basic fact is this.  Having tanks as an organic part of the Marine Corps seems to have run its course.  Having the US Army provide a dedicated Heavy Combat Brigade to support Marine Corps operations seems to be the solution to an unfortunate problem.