Most people view the AH-64 as an unstoppable weapon of war.
It has the reputation of being the most lethal, survivable helicopter flying today. It boasts impressive electronics, weaponry and weapons.
But in 2003 in the attack on Karbala, members of the 11th Aviation Regimen, 3rd Infantry Division in particular had a very bad day.
This from Wikipedia...
Engagement
The 31 Apaches of the U.S. 11th Regiment took off from Rams Base. One
crashed immediately after takeoff when its pilot became disoriented. As
they turned north toward Karbala, signals intelligence picked up over 50 Iraqi cell phone calls alerting the enemy's forward units of the Apaches.
As the strike neared Karbala, the Iraqis signaled their troops to
open fire by turning off and then, a few second later, on the area's
lights. Ground troops, having recovered from the suppression air strike,
opened up with small arms and other weapons. Lieutenant Jason King, pilot of Apache "Palerider 16", was hit by AK-47 fire[8] in the neck and suffered a severe hemorrage, but he never lost consciousness.[3] He was later evacuated to Germany for surgery, but returned to his unit a few weeks later.[8]
The Apaches were reluctant to return fire; most enemy fire was coming
from houses and the risk of collateral damage was high. The helicopters
scattered in search of the Medina Division, but were hampered by poor
intelligence. Apache "Vampire 12", flown by Warrant Officers
David S. Williams and Ronald D. Young Jr., was forced down after
gunfire severed the hydraulics. The air commander's radio was also hit,
preventing communication with the other helicopters.
The Apaches turned for home after a half-hour of combat. Most were
without functioning navigation equipment or sights. At least two
narrowly avoided a mid-air collision.[3]
Aftermath
Of the 29 returning Apaches, all but one suffered serious damage. On
average each helicopter had 15-20 bullet holes. One helicopter took 29
hits. Sixteen main rotor blades, six tail blades, six engines and five
drive shafts were damaged beyond repair. In one squadron only a single
helicopter was deemed fit to fly. It took a month for the 11th Regiment
was ready to fight again. The casualties sustained by the Apaches
induced a change of tactics. Attack helicopters would now be used to
reveal the location of enemy troops, allowing them to be destroyed by
artillery and air strikes.[3]
Thomas E. White, who was then United States Secretary of the Army, felt disappointed by the outcome of the battle, adding "we were very fortunate we didn't lose more aircraft."[9]
There were some big changes for Army aviation after this battle. Not only would it lead to a more 'vigorous' use of artillery but it would end the deep strike role for Army aviation.
Fred Kaplan wrote in Slate Magazine an article called "Chop the Chopper"...
The U.S. Army's only disastrous operation in Gulf War II (at least the only one we know about) took place on
March 24, when 33 Apache helicopters were ordered to move out ahead of the 3
rd
Infantry Division and to attack an Iraqi Republican Guard regiment in
the suburbs of Karbala. Meeting heavy fire from small arms and
shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenades, the Apaches flew back to
base, 30 of them shot up, several disablingly so. One helicopter was
shot down in the encounter, and its two crewmen were taken prisoner.
After that incident, Apaches were used more cautiously—on
reconnaissance missions or for firing at small groups of armored
vehicles. Rarely if ever did they penetrate far beyond the front line of
battle, out in front of U.S. ground troops or without the escort of
fixed-wing aircraft flying far overhead.
Shortly afterward, when a speech by Saddam Hussein was broadcast over
Iraqi television, some armchair commentators observed that the speech
was probably live, or at least very recent, because he referred to the
downing of an Apache. In fact, that proved nothing. If one thing could
have been predicted before the war started, it was that an Apache would
be shot down.
Last year, during the Afghanistan war, seven Apaches were flown in to
attack Taliban fighters as part of Operation Anaconda. They all got
shot up, again by RPGs and machine-gun fire. None crashed, but five were
so damaged they were declared "non-mission-capable"—in other words,
unable to go back into combat without extensive repair—after the first
day.
In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, 24 Apache helicopters were
transported to the allied base in Albania. Their arrival was anticipated
by many officers and analysts as a turning point in the war. Yet,
within days, two choppers crashed during training exercises. Commanders
decided not to send any of them into battle; the risk of losing them to
Serbian surface-to-air missiles was considered too great.
Attack helicopters have always been troublesome. The U.S. Army lost
over 5,000 helicopters in the Vietnam War. (Nor is this a uniquely
American problem: The Soviets lost hundreds of Hind helicopters to
mujahideen firing shoulder-launched Stinger missiles during their Afghan
venture.)
This sorry chronicle raises the question: Why did the Army build helicopters in the first place?
It all goes back to the end of World War II, when the Air Force
became an independent service of the armed forces. (Before and during
the war, air forces were a branch of the Army.) In its first few years
of independence, the Air Force became involved in tumultuous budget
battles with the other services. Finally, in April 1948, Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal called a meeting with the service chiefs in Key
West, Fla., where they divvied up "roles and missions." The emerging
document was called the Key West Agreement.
An informal understanding that grew out of the accord was that the Air
Force (and, to an extent, the Navy) would have a monopoly on fixed-wing
combat planes.
Quite honestly I never liked Kaplan. I always considered him a hack and believed that he was too influential when it came to military matters during the Bush Administration. But on this issue he gets it half right. Attack helicopters fill a vital role and should continue but he's right on this point... The Key West Agreement should be scrapped and the US Army should be allowed to field Close Air Support aircraft.
The Battle of Karbala proves that if nothing else does.