Gun control.

If you're on the fence about the 2nd amendment then check out this quote...

”This year will go down in history. For the first time, a civilized nation has full gun registration. Our streets will be safer, our police more efficient, and the world will follow our lead into the future!” ~Adolph Hitler, 1935, on The Weapons Act of Nazi Germany

Wow.

The bastard was right.  Germany, England, Australia, France and many other nations have followed.  Looks like he just might win in the end...at leas in those countries.

On Rappel

Cpl. Gerard Coon with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit's battalion landing team 3/1 rappels from a parked CH-46E Sea Knight aboard USS Makin Island Feb. 10. The Sea Knight is with the unit's aviation combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 (Reinforced). The unit is currently deployed aboard the amphibious assault ship as part of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, which is a U.S. Central Command theater reserve force. The group is also providing support for maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet area of responsibility.

Rawley gets it wrong. Marines on aircraft carriers is about self preservation.

Chris Rawley pinned an article for Information Dissemination in which he lauds the idea of putting detachments of Marines aboard aircraft carriers.

He is missing the real issue here.  It isn't about making the carrier more effective.  Its about preserving the aircraft carrier. 

Take a look at the pic above.  It shows in great detail the standard compliment of a deployed US aircraft carrier today.  A ship designed to carry approximately 100 aircraft is lucky to leave the dock with 60.  Additionally a squadron or two of those airplanes are Marine Air.

Carrier aviation is in trouble and if a bean counter ever takes a good look at the number of carriers that we have and the way that we're utilizing them then you'll see an axe come out quick.  But this is what Rawley has to say....

LCDR Benjamin Armstrong, one of the up and coming naval officers who truly gets irregular warfare, has written a fine article on maritime raids for this month's Proceedings. His recommendation to expand the utility of carriers by adding small Marine landing teams and MV-22s makes a lot of sense. CVNs can easily augment our amphibious capacity and provide significant flexibility to conduct raids and other ground-centric missions when gators are not around. This move could be compared to the addition of F-35Bs to large deck amphibious ships to augment our CSGs striking power. In other words, our CSGs should become more ARG-like and our ESGs/ARGs can become more CSG-like. If our gator fleet shrinks further, we’ll need to get creative in how we employ all ships in support of objectives ashore, and implementation of BJ’s suggestions would be a smart step in that direction.

Read the whole thing but a few things are telling.

1.  Notice that he talks about putting F-35B's aboard carriers...a nice fig leaf but that was dismissed out of hand by carrier Navy.  They stated that it would disrupt flight operations when HQMC offered that as a possibility to make up for the loss of carrier squadrons that was complained about.

2.  Notice the attempt to make the carrier into a more ARG type vessel.  A bigger fig leaf.  If the carriers can perform ARG type missions then it should be asked why do we need the ARG?  It is a power play that is so obvious its pitiful.

3.  Lastly, notice that no one is talking about embarking SOCOM aboard carriers.  Wonder why?  I make the guess that it would cause a loss of autonomy.  Yeah you could put SEALs or Rangers or Special Forces aboard carriers and rotate them but you would have an new master in Tampa to answer to.  Its nice supporting SOCOM but having to work for them can be a bitch if you're not part of the clubhouse.

This whole thing is a farce.  Its all about making the carriers more relevant especially in light of the rise of the Amphibians (Libya most recently when no one asked where are the carriers, before that Japan and Haiti...Carriers are faster but have no manpower to do the soft missions...Marines on board would open up that possibility as well).  This is a bad idea.  Everyone knows it, no one will admit it.

Elements of Power nails it on the new bomber.

Elements of Power nails it in his analysis of news on the new Air Force Bomber.  Read the whole thing and subscribe to him but this part had me saying out loud...damn it!  Why didn't I remember that!

Hey Phil? About that 'doing things differently' angle. If we would have bought 80-100 B-2s, in the first place the unit acquisition cost would have been far less than those "$550M" in 2010 dollars, and probably much less than that even in then-year dollars. CBO numbers for only 26 B-2s in the early 90s was $540M per plane. Northrop offered to sell the AF only half as many (40)  B-2Cs in 2001 for a fixed price of $545M/aircraft.

We've been down this road before and it looks like we're going down it again.  Being penny wise and pound foolish!  I'm referring specifically to the offer by Northrop of selling the plane for a fixed price!

Wow.

Perhaps what we really need in our Defense Procurement System are a group of historians.  We seem to keep forgetting ours.

David Cenciotti has a couple of great articles out.

David has a couple of great articles out.

The first is an outstanding photo essay on a new (at least to me) Nato Tactical Leadership Program, and the second is news from the other side of the Atlantic on the recent Italian decision on the numbers of F-35's to procure.

Therefore, along with the reduction by 43,000 people to abate the current 70 percent of the overall defense budget for spending on military personnel, the review has led to the revision of the some important programs. First of all, the much criticized F-35 program.
Accordingly, 41 aircraft will be scrapped leaving the Italian Air Force and Navy with only 90 F-35 in the A and B version. The latter, recently removed from probation, will replace the Navy’s AV-8B+ Harrier II on board the Cavour aircraft carrier as well as the Air Force’s AMX, both involved in the recent Air War in Libya.
“The F-35 program was reviewed. Nevertheless it remains a major commitment in terms of technology, technology transfer to the industry and employment” Di Paola said few days after placing the first order for three F-35s.

I love reading this guys blog especially when it comes to the F-35 because I can't quite pin him down on being a supporter or hater.

He is definitely playing it down the middle and is to be commended for it.  Go to his site to read it in full.  Now, if I could only get him to make that watermark just a tad smaller, all would be right with the world.

24th MEU's certification exercise continues.

Modest proposal. Scrap the Key West Agreement.

Most people view the AH-64 as an unstoppable weapon of war.

It has the reputation of being the most lethal, survivable helicopter flying today.  It boasts impressive electronics, weaponry and weapons.


But in 2003 in the attack on Karbala,  members of the 11th Aviation Regimen, 3rd Infantry Division in particular had a very bad day.

This from Wikipedia...

 Engagement

The 31 Apaches of the U.S. 11th Regiment took off from Rams Base. One crashed immediately after takeoff when its pilot became disoriented. As they turned north toward Karbala, signals intelligence picked up over 50 Iraqi cell phone calls alerting the enemy's forward units of the Apaches.
As the strike neared Karbala, the Iraqis signaled their troops to open fire by turning off and then, a few second later, on the area's lights. Ground troops, having recovered from the suppression air strike, opened up with small arms and other weapons. Lieutenant Jason King, pilot of Apache "Palerider 16", was hit by AK-47 fire^[8] in the neck and suffered a severe hemorrage, but he never lost consciousness.^[3] He was later evacuated to Germany for surgery, but returned to his unit a few weeks later.^[8]

The Apaches were reluctant to return fire; most enemy fire was coming from houses and the risk of collateral damage was high. The helicopters scattered in search of the Medina Division, but were hampered by poor intelligence. Apache "Vampire 12", flown by Warrant Officers David S. Williams and Ronald D. Young Jr., was forced down after gunfire severed the hydraulics. The air commander's radio was also hit, preventing communication with the other helicopters.

The Apaches turned for home after a half-hour of combat. Most were without functioning navigation equipment or sights. At least two narrowly avoided a mid-air collision.^[3]

Aftermath

Of the 29 returning Apaches, all but one suffered serious damage. On average each helicopter had 15-20 bullet holes. One helicopter took 29 hits. Sixteen main rotor blades, six tail blades, six engines and five drive shafts were damaged beyond repair. In one squadron only a single helicopter was deemed fit to fly. It took a month for the 11th Regiment was ready to fight again. The casualties sustained by the Apaches induced a change of tactics. Attack helicopters would now be used to reveal the location of enemy troops, allowing them to be destroyed by artillery and air strikes.^[3]
Thomas E. White, who was then United States Secretary of the Army, felt disappointed by the outcome of the battle, adding "we were very fortunate we didn't lose more aircraft."^[9]

There were some big changes for Army aviation after this battle.  Not only would it lead to a more 'vigorous' use of artillery but it would end the deep strike role for Army aviation.

Fred Kaplan wrote in Slate Magazine an article called "Chop the Chopper"...

The U.S. Army's only disastrous operation in Gulf War II (at least the only one we know about) took place on March 24, when 33 Apache helicopters were ordered to move out ahead of the 3^rd Infantry Division and to attack an Iraqi Republican Guard regiment in the suburbs of Karbala. Meeting heavy fire from small arms and shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenades, the Apaches flew back to base, 30 of them shot up, several disablingly so. One helicopter was shot down in the encounter, and its two crewmen were taken prisoner.

After that incident, Apaches were used more cautiously—on reconnaissance missions or for firing at small groups of armored vehicles. Rarely if ever did they penetrate far beyond the front line of battle, out in front of U.S. ground troops or without the escort of fixed-wing aircraft flying far overhead.

Shortly afterward, when a speech by Saddam Hussein was broadcast over Iraqi television, some armchair commentators observed that the speech was probably live, or at least very recent, because he referred to the downing of an Apache. In fact, that proved nothing. If one thing could have been predicted before the war started, it was that an Apache would be shot down.

Last year, during the Afghanistan war, seven Apaches were flown in to attack Taliban fighters as part of Operation Anaconda. They all got shot up, again by RPGs and machine-gun fire. None crashed, but five were so damaged they were declared "non-mission-capable"—in other words, unable to go back into combat without extensive repair—after the first day.

In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, 24 Apache helicopters were transported to the allied base in Albania. Their arrival was anticipated by many officers and analysts as a turning point in the war. Yet, within days, two choppers crashed during training exercises. Commanders decided not to send any of them into battle; the risk of losing them to Serbian surface-to-air missiles was considered too great.

Attack helicopters have always been troublesome. The U.S. Army lost over 5,000 helicopters in the Vietnam War. (Nor is this a uniquely American problem: The Soviets lost hundreds of Hind helicopters to mujahideen firing shoulder-launched Stinger missiles during their Afghan venture.)

This sorry chronicle raises the question: Why did the Army build helicopters in the first place?

It all goes back to the end of World War II, when the Air Force became an independent service of the armed forces. (Before and during the war, air forces were a branch of the Army.) In its first few years of independence, the Air Force became involved in tumultuous budget battles with the other services. Finally, in April 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal called a meeting with the service chiefs in Key West, Fla., where they divvied up "roles and missions." The emerging document was called the Key West Agreement. An informal understanding that grew out of the accord was that the Air Force (and, to an extent, the Navy) would have a monopoly on fixed-wing combat planes.

Quite honestly I never liked Kaplan.  I always considered him a hack and believed that he was too influential when it came to military matters during the Bush Administration.  But on this issue he gets it half right. Attack helicopters fill a vital role and should continue but he's right on this point... The Key West Agreement should be scrapped and the US Army should be allowed to field Close Air Support aircraft.

The Battle of Karbala proves that if nothing else does.

Singapore's Armed Forces. Maybe the best in the Pacific.

The above video depicts the Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle. 

What's noteworthy is the Battlefield Management System.  Quite honestly they appear to be ahead of us...or at the very least equal to the US in this field.

For heavy armor they're equipped with Leopard 2's.  Their air force is equipped with top of the line F-15E's...they have advanced submarines, and outstanding infantry.

They may have the best all around force in the Pacific. 

Blast from the Past. Buccaneer. The ultimate naval strike fighter...the video.

r.crichton7(thanks dude) sent me this video and I just had to share it. 

 

Training of Foreign Forces isn't only for Special Forces anymore.

A Georgian soldier with Scout Platoon, Delta Company, 23rd Georgian Infantry Battalion provides security during a close-air support exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, Feb. 9, 2012. The JMRC, working with U.S. Marine Forces Europe as part of the Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force, conducted mission rehearsal exercises for Georgian infantry battalions to assist them in preparing to deploy for operations in Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Kirk Evanoff/Released)

Training foreign forces ain't just a Special Forces mission anymore.  One of things that came out of the war on terror was the building of relationships.  I haven't covered it but the Black Sea Rotational Force has made some pretty good friends in the region.

BAE is doing armor now?

Body armor, gear, helmets, military and government vehicle armors and aircraft armor? 

Wow.

BAE is diversifying big time.

Pic of the day. Mickey Mouse games in a war zone.

Soldiers from the Minnesota National Guard complete a ruck march to earn the Expert Infantryman Badge at Forward Operating Base Gerber, in Kuwait, on Jan. 27, 2012. The Expert Infantryman Badge is awarded to soldiers who hold infantry or special forces military occupational specialties and complete a series of tests. DoD photo by Cpl. Trisha Betz, U.S. Army. (Released)

Wow.

I see the US Army plays games too.

This guy is wearing patches on both arms which means (and I'm assuming that he's a grunt) that he's earned a Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB).  With that being the case then I'm sure he could care less about earning a Expert Infantryman Badge (EID), but training must be done.