Southern Justice!

Massive hat tip to Defense Tech.
I usually complain about the militarization of law enforcement.  But this just rocks.  Good to go!

NOTE*

Texas didn't name their boats after politicians, celebrities, or any other non-entity.  They named them after their fallen heroes.  Man!  These guys get it!

The Debate: Should Special Ops be its own separate service?

Not my debate issue but one that was held on the pages of US News and World Report's Debate Club.  It's to be expected.  SOCOM in general and SEALs in particular have been drumming up press lately.  Much to the chagrin of the old timers, this new breed of Special Operations personnel love the lime light.

The person putting forth the idea that Special Ops needs to be its own service is none other than Douglas Macgregor the guy that authored Breaking the Phalanx.

He's one of those persons that likes re-arranging deck chairs and trying out new ideas on actual forces without experimentation.  A bad mix in my opinion but he's become famous for his ideas.  To the article....

If Americans learned anything from the colossally expensive use of large general purpose Army and Marine combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's that a low-profile mix of special operations forces and covert operators to find and liquidate anti-Western insurgent, terrorist, and criminal elements is a more effective and economical solution in the Middle East. Special forces are also far better suited to foreign internal defense missions than general purpose Army or Marine forces.

In addition, a smaller defense budget is not only inevitable; it's a national economic necessity. Budgetary realities dictate a strategic shift toward more efficient and effective means of national defense, means predicated on a lighter footprint overseas with far fewer soldiers and Marines stationed on foreign soil.
Thus, it's time to make special operations a separate service. But Americans in and out of uniform must scale back their expectations regarding what such a service could achieve on its own. In a conflict with a capable opponent that fields effective armed forces and maintains a cohesive society, special operations forces can only operate on the margins in support of general purpose forces. Special ops is most effective in the developing world, where societies are weak and armed forces are ineffective or nonexistent. These are places like the Middle East, Africa, and most of Latin America, where capable air-defense networks, strong armies, and internal police forces are few and far between. In these settings, special operations forces can play a decisive strategic role.

There is also another reason why special operations should become a separate service. Operatives should be legally accountable for actions involving the train and equip mission, as well as direct action missions beyond America’s borders. Like all of the current services, a separate special forces service must not operate without regional combatant commander knowledge or permission anywhere under any circumstances.
One way to establish special forces as a separate service is to return the general purpose Marines to control of the Navy while also permanently reassigning selected Army, Marine and Air Force units to Special Operations Forces and Special Forces control. This would keep the number of service branches the same. All of these proposed changes should be considered in the context of a new National Security Act designed to replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff system with a unified national defense staff under a uniformed national defense chief.

I say let them do it.  But with a caveat.  66,000 people makes SOCOM as large as 3 US ARMY DIVISIONS!


No more leveraging off conventional forces.

They should be self contained and self sufficient.  Separate base, aircraft etc...

With a force that large they should be able to perform any mission short of an invasion without support of conventional forces.

This has been in the making for at least the last 10 years.  Time to make it happen.

Marine procurement games & the Marine Personnel Carrier.

Talking with friends about the Marine Personnel Carrier Program and there are some disturbing facts sitting in front of our faces.

1.  The MPC was conceived as a way to make up for a transport shortfall because the numbers of EFV's was going to be reduced due to costs.  The plan was to be able to transport the assault wave in EFV's with follow on forces to gain battlefield mobility with the MPC.

2.  The MPC promises to give battlefield mobility to keep up with the M1 Abrams, a certain degree of ocean going ability, protection against IEDs and full ship board compatibility.  In essence it will be more capable than the current AAV in all realms EXCEPT for ship to shore amphibious ops.

3.  For better or worse the USMC is moving toward a quasi-Commando force with a premium being placed on aerial insertion of not only raid but forcible entry forces.  With the current budgetary pressure and programed spending being locked into the air wing's F-35, AH-1Z, UH-1Y, MV-22, and CH-53K I don't expect this to change any time soon.

4.  Supposedly the AAV is going to be upgraded, the MPC procured and the Amphibious Combat Vehicle developed to replace the AAV, which the EFV failed to do.  How are we going to afford to procure the MPC, upgrade the AAV AND develop the ACV?

Me and my buddies came to this conclusion.

The Marine Corps is playing games.

The MPC is going to be the replacement for the AAV and the ACV will be ultimately canceled due to budget pressures.  The JLTV will be touted as making up for overland mobility shortfalls and the CH-53K will be dragged out of development purgatory in order to tout the MPC's ship to shore mobility, additionally the Navy will push the follow on to the LCAC and deem the amphibious tractor obsolete.

I hope I'm wrong but little else makes sense.  Of course HQMC could be playing it straight and the plan really is to develop these vehicles as planned.  But if that's the case then what is the make up of the Assault Amphibian Battalions?

How many MPC's will they have?  How many AAV/ACV's?  Will the make up depend on locale?  Will we tailor all AAV/ACV Battalions to support ops in the Pacific while using MPC's in the Middle East and Africa?

Lots of questions.

Very few answers from the program office.

Pic of the day. Israeli Armored Reconnaissance

A fighter from the Armored Brigade's Reconnaissance Unit levels the way for the following tanks during an exercise of the Armored Brigade's Headquarters.

Africa's the new hotspot. 26th MEU trains for its deployment.

Photos by Lance Cpl. Adwin Esters

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 Marines, from 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company, fire M40 sniper rifles at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 Marines, from 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company, fire M40 sniper rifles at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 Marines, from 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company, fire M40 sniper rifles at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

A Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 Marine, from 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company, fires M40 sniper rifles at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 Marines, from 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company, fire M40 sniper rifles at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

Maj. John Brown, engineer officer, right, and Capt. Thomas Waller, a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force 12.2 team leader, fire a M40 sniper rifle at 1,000-yard targets during a training exercise aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., Feb. 10, 2012. The training was a part of their pre-deployment exercises preparing the Marines for their upcoming deployment to Africa.

NOTE*

They're not even hiding it anymore.  26th MEU is heading to Africa as part of its upcoming deployment.  It appears more and more like the secret war in the horn of Africa is becoming public.  My only question is why is it necessary for an MEU to provide support to SOCOM's operations?  They have a Division (-) of personnel in house.  

F-35s at NAS Patuxent River

General Dynamics Land Systems...the 500 pound gorilla in the Marine Personnel Carrier Contest.

US Army Stryker ICV

Piranha V, failed entrant in the UK FRES competition

Piranha III, in service world wide most notably with the Canadian Army, the Spanish Marine Corps and the Brazilian Marine Corps.

A 500 pound gorilla.

That's about the best description of General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) if they decide to jump with both feet into the Marine Personnel Carrier Contest.

THEY ARE NOT GIVING OUT ANY INFO!

Zip.  Zilch.  Nada.

I have written everyone I can think of in their outfit and they must hit delete without thinking about it.  BAE and Lockheed were cautious but were forthcoming with as much info as they thought reasonable.  It is after all a competition.

GDLS.  The info on what they're going to be presenting is password protected, and marked eyes only.  I have a feeling it has to do with the tremendous burn that they received from the British when it came to their FRES contest.  From the outside looking in they had a much better product than the ASCOD, yet were shot down in a weird cost shoot out (we keep coming back to that factor instead of the best vehicle winning).

With that being said I'll list a few bullet points on what will make GDLS a formidable opponent in this contest...even though I'm not quite sold on their offering in comparison to what BAE and Lockheed are putting forward.

1.  They could attempt to make the Stryker amphibious and push commonality with the US Army.  As a matter of fact if they can make the Stryker surf ready and keep many of the components the same then they're well on their way to winning....but...

2.  Number one in this depends on what the Army does with its M-113 replacement program and whether the Marine Corps will wait for them to decide.  If the Stryker wins that contest then the first option becomes even more attractive.

3.  Eyes will also be on the contest in Canada for a close combat vehicle.  GDLS was at one time going to enter the LAV-V with the Lancer turret in that contest.  If the Canadians get their act together and make that buy then the Marines could be tempted to go with that setup.  The LAV-V though has not been touted as an amphibious vehicle and I don't know if it swims or could be made to.  What I do know is that the Lancer turret is an outstanding looking piece of gear.  The Canadians will be running ballistics tests and the LAV-V supposedly is an uparmored variant of the LAV-III.

4.  The Piranha III is in service world wide with a number of forces.  The Marines on the east coast did a training evolution with the Spanish Marines (I believe it was the 24th MEU) and got an up close look at the beast.

5.  A major down fall of this vehicle is its troop carriage.  Its limited to a crew of 3+6.  Not competitive.

6.  If this does turn into a price war then GDLS should have it going away.  They already have manufacturing set up.  A supply chain already in place. NSN setup for ordering parts, etc...

To sum it up.

I have no idea what GDLS is going to do.

If they offer the Piranha III and if its compatible with the Stryker as far as drive train, components, parts etc...are concerned then they will win a price war.  All they'll really have to do is meet requirements.

We're in the unfortunate place of having the air wing gobbling up a tremendous part of the budget (not bitching, just pointing this out).  With the F-35, AH-1Z, UH-1Y, MV-22 and the CH-53K all gobbling up funds, it looks like the ground side is just going to have to gut it out.

A side note to all this is you can bet that the only reason why the JLTV is still alive in Marine Corps planning is because the US Army is basically subsidizing the buy.

But back to the Piranha.  I just can't put my finger on but I'm just not warm to this vehicle....

Note*
My buddy Grim tells me I might have flubbed the issues that GDLS has in the FRES competition. He's probably right. Between the European, US and Canadian divisions its hard to keep up with the vehicles, how they're designated and what competitions they're involved in and heck, even the vehicles designations are confusing.