Friday, May 20, 2011

The “Kevlar coffin.”


That's what US Army Soldiers in one Stryker Unit that deployed to Afghanistan called their vehicles...Kevlar Coffins.

That's either an indictment of the vehicles or the tactics they used.  Since I am a homer, I'll blame the vehicles and it appears that the US Army agrees.  This story from the Stars and Stripes describes how they're about to deploy double hulled vehicles Army wide.  Read the whole thing but here's a juicy tidbit.

The double-V hull design, which went from conception to production in less than a year, will replace conventional, flat-bottomed Strykers that have seen extensive service in Iraq and made an inauspicious debut in Afghanistan in June 2009 with the deployment of the 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division to Kandahar province.
Members of that brigade, which had 37 troops killed in action and 238 wounded during its yearlong mission, reportedly called the vehicles the “Kevlar coffin.” Things got so bad that part way through the deployment, the Stryker unit was diverted away from the main fighting in Kandahar to a “freedom of movement mission” guarding roads on the periphery of where the toughest combat was taking place.
Unfortunately, the strain of repeated combat tours necessitated the Strykers’ deployment to Afghanistan to “take their turn downrange,” said retired Lt. Col. David Johnson, executive director of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. Stryker brigades’ soldiers — if not their vehicles — need to deploy to Afghanistan so that other units have enough dwell time at home.
But the Stryker vehicle itself might not be the best option in places like Afghanistan, he said. It was designed to be a rapidly deployable, medium-armor vehicle that would fight in a medium- to high-intensity conflict, carry troops to an assault position and dismount the troops.
“[It] isn’t perfectly suited for the environment in Afghanistan or a low-intensity conflict with IEDs,” he said. “The Stryker is a platform. If it doesn’t work, use another tool.”
The Army's got a problem.  They've re-oriented their entire force around the "Stryker" Brigade concept.  If this vehicle isn't adequate across all conflicts then its time to rethink organizational philosophy.

Maybe its time to bring back Light Fighter Divisions?

8 comments :

  1. There is no such thing as a vehicle which is adequate across all conflicts. The Stryker fills a useful niche.

    I don't see how light fighters will do any better. IEDs that kill Strykers will obliterate HMMWVs.

    Either unit can use MRAPs.

    The double-V Strykers should help, but insurgents can always bury bigger bombs.

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  2. my point was about building forces that can function across all...Stryker units are designed for either medium or high.

    the Pentagon is pushing the idea that low intensity conflict will be the rule and not the exception. my thoughts were that it would be better to design units around infantry and not vehicles as the Stryker units are currently tailored.

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  3. Actually, IIRC, Strykers were meant for low to medium intensity. Use in high intensity conflicts required augmentation.

    Unfortunately nothing but purpose-built, heavy MRAPs are even passable against large IEDs. Even tanks have trouble with them. And MRAPs don't do particularly well in any other type of combat.

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  4. I wish the armed forces could see the unique opportunity here. Both recently cancelled FCS and EFV programs leave a huge vacuum, why can't they put their resources together and come up with something decent together, like the JSF program, a variant each for the Army and Marines.

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  5. The Stryker IS "decent".

    Boxer weighs twice as much. It weighs more than a Bradley.

    The double-V Stryker ups the GVW to around 25 tonnes though, so starting to get in the same ballpark.

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  6. The problem is, many Army vehicles were designed in splendid intellectual isolation. They're great conceptually, within the framework of a theoretical doctrine; but when they get on the ground in a combat environment, the enemy may not have read (or agree with) the doctrine in question. Reality trumps theory, every time.

    I recall the criticisms leveled against South Africa's armored fighting vehicles back in the 1980's. Western experts derided them as too big, too tall, too heavy, etc., etc., etc., . . . but they won every engagement they entered, even when significantly outclassed (theoretically) by Soviet armor. They won because they were generally suited to their operating environment, and those using them relied on tactics and co-operation to make up for any shortcomings in their vehicles. Overall, that flexibility was what produced victory.

    I suspect the US is trying to find a technological solution to an operational or tactical problem. Sounds familiar, doesn't it? It also doesn't work. Build an MRAP, the enemy will build bigger and better IED's. Upgrade the MRAP's to cope with the latter, and the enemy will stop using IED's and switch to mobility impediments that bog the big, unwieldy super-MRAP's down in their own tracks. (That's already happening in the 'Stan.)

    Technology is not the solution. It never has been, and it never will be.

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  7. wow. i remember reading about the war down there. the S. Africans were kicking butt with what many thought was a less technologically advanced force.

    but ironically they were better at bushcraft and like you said had better designed (tailored) vehicles for the area they were fighting in.

    i don't know what happened with this Stryker unit but something terrible happened to them...they lost a whole lot of guys.

    a whole lot of them.

    then a couple of members went rogue.

    i don't know what came first but this will be an interesting story once all the facts come out.

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