Thursday, February 13, 2014

Navy Matters Blog and the logistics requirement of an MEU.


Navy Matters Blog (highly recommended) wrote an article covering the logistics of an amphibious assault and the capability of an MEU to conduct one.  Read it here.

The problem with the article?  The Marine Corps has failed to provide the public...and bloggers, a definition of an MEU's capabilities.  This is the best definition I could find on the interwebs, via Military Factory....
The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization.  The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) is a Marine expeditionary unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment, that is trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized missions of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized
demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The MEU(SOC) is not a special operations force but, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commander, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. Also called MEU(SOC). See also aviation combat element; combat service support element; command element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.
The key words?

Limited scope and duration.

That means that an MEU will not be conducting an amphibious assault.  An amphibious raid?  Yes.  An assault?  No.

Which brings me to my last point.  The MEU while extremely useful, capable and combat proven has to be used wisely.  Below is the equipment fit and you'll see that its still a pretty light force....Check out the equipment table here and consider a fictional assault with 4 M1 Abrams MBTs?  15 AAVs? 6 AH-1Zs?  Etc....

Marine Corps doctrine states that a Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the smallest unit capable of conducting an amphibious assault....and with good reason.

9 comments :

  1. Whether on the lowest level - MEU - or on the bigger one - MEB (of whatever ultimate size) - both need to execute on these objectives:
    - getting from ship to shore,
    - getting there preferably in fast and stealthy manner,
    - getting there in a First Wave that is tactically as effective as possible,
    - getting there in a number of concurrent insertion-points to confuse and stretch thinner the adversaries' defense resources,
    - getting there with an equally plausible Second Wave with further Combat-assets, and then Logistics, etc.
    - again and again,
    - and from a distance that offers much more plausible protection to the ARG than the current 12nm 'plan against shore-defenses.

    The MEU roster includes mega-heavy M1A (w/ TUSK-elements), lots of weighty APCs, etc., etc., NONE of which can be helo'd into the theater.

    Taken together, this means that the bulk of the MEU would have to be be arriving via a fast heavy-lift Connector.

    Then you multiply this roster until you've scaled it up to
    - MEB levels of Ground Combat Element assets,
    - plus Air Combat Element which needs its own dedicated support via fuel, ammo, crew, in-the-field repair and maintenance etc. (ACE),
    - plus Logistics (CSSE)
    and you arrive at a requirement for even more fast heavy-lift Connectors.

    It has always been known that a MEU is indeed inherently limited in its potency. However including 4 MBTs (plus 1 recovery tank) along with 155mm arti unarguably reflects the interest in maximum 'surgical' amphibious punch, despite its modest overall size. The MEU thus has no competitors in any other armed force in the world.

    Therefore, Delivery- and Support- demands for an MEU just plain dictate Connectors that can effectively link the ARG with the shore - and must do so from a distance which is much safer for the ARG than currently practicable with the extant fleet of LCU-1610s and LCACs - amounting to how many actually available per MEU, Sol ?? Say, 3-4+3-5 ?

    Which makes the fast heavy-lift Connector likely the most important acquisition-objective for MEU and MEB Commanders.

    No point in having Amphibs, MEU and MEB gear and Marines - but then finding ourselves without a plausible heavy-lift ship-to-shore protocol to delivers a potent First Wave in One Wave, and in multiple locations.

    Picture trying to get this MEU roster to shore with the current Connectors in those very limited available numbers from an ARG-safer distance from shore than 6-12nm.... ??!!

    Bad plan !

    P.S.: Again, Sol, how many LCU and LCAC per ARG/MEU available now ?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. wow. are you nuts?

      the USMC has been conducting raids with the equipment fit that we currently have for years. additionally the Brits (who have much less capability than we do) performed a mechanized raid in Africa using BV-10'!

      Delete
    2. Currently, LHD's carry 3 LCAC or 2 LCU 1600 (Most always the LCAC), LSD's carrie 3 LCAC (ramp down) or 4 LCAC (ramp up) or 2 LCU-1600. LPD 17 carries 2 LCAC. So the potential of having 9 LCAC's on a MEU exists but always there is an LCU in the mix, either two on he LSD or 1 on the LPD. So the potential mixes are:
      8 LCAC
      7 LCAC 1 LCU (If LPD carries LCU)
      5 LCAC 2 LCU (If LSD carrries 2 LCU)

      It really comes down to what the CLF and CATF decide.

      Delete
  2. Or perhaps what the Commandant James Amos had to say just the other day at WEST 2014.
    Listen up Sol !!

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHWy1LIYyjQ

    Gen. Amos starts an intriguing monologue at about 0:12:20 and goes on and on.
    Big exclamation-mark in there about Connectors and assault-operations.
    And then later just pinch more, for good measure.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. And do listen for him staging ARG/MEU at 70-80nm offshore... from where to dispatch Connectors.

      Shift in paradigms.

      Delete
    2. you don't get it TwentyTwenty!

      no one is listening to this son of a bitch anymore! we're all just waiting for him to carry his sorry ass on to retirement so the next Commandant can fix everything he fucked up. don't believe me? ask another Marine in the know. Amos has no legacy except for fucking up a great organization, turning leaders into ass kissers and basically fucking Marines at every rank at every opportunity he got.

      so no.

      i could care less what this gutless wonder says on your tape. besides 70 or 80km off shore is WELL within anti-ship missile range. the enemy won't even break a sweat hitting us at that distance.

      Delete
    3. This comment has been removed by the author.

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    4. From 70-80 Nautical Miles, what are the odds of any self-deploying ACV - tracked or big-wheeled ??
      Zero.
      In every which way technically, ergonomically, tactically impossible.


      The only way forward then is greater stand-off distances, now out to 70-80 nm, then beyond - as systems and practices mature.


      Commandant Amos thus proposes to protect the amphibious future of the USMC through an aggressive move towards enabling ARG/MEU to even remotely have a chance against shore-defenses.

      General Amos is the first Commandant to state the obvious that Connectors are essential, and that this element of amphibious hardware and thus tactics has been woefully under-developed.

      He repeatedly emphasized that USMC needs heavy-lift fast Connectors, and that he is putting money towards developing them.

      To summarize:
      - he did inherit the F-35B program with all its challenges,
      - he did inherit the consequences of draw-down from two concurrent wars,
      - he has to manage Sequestration,
      and yet,
      - beginning with the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group Report April 2012, he looks ahead as the Marines move out of the desert and mountains back into the amphibious realm,
      - establishes the innovation-centric Ellis Group,
      - recognizes the need to protect the MEU aboard the ARG by sheer distance from hostile shore,
      - and moves towards fast heavy-lift Connector capabilities to assure USMC's amphibious future.

      That is leadership through fiscally-trying times and when a clear institutional focus on USMC's core competency is essential - multi-plying amphibious effectiveness.

      Not an inconsequential legacy at all...

      "Amos saved USMC's amphibious future" - or so the bumper-sticker reads I've seen pre-production samples of.

      Delete
  3. Thanks for sharing..May I know what's the meaning of MEU?
    logistics management

    ReplyDelete

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