Wednesday, June 25, 2014

ACV News. Something evil is brewing...

Thanks for the article Lee...


via SEAPower Magazine.
On the equipment side, the commandant said his No. 1 priority was replacing the Vietnam-vintage AAV7 assault amphibious vehicles so the Marines could continue to perform their traditional mission of projecting force from the sea.
Amos noted that much has changed in the years since the Marines started their effort to replace the AAVs with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle that offered motorboat speed on water, but ultimately proved too complicated and two expensive to continue. The subsequent effort with the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), a tracked vehicle with fast water speed, also was found to be ill-suited for the current expeditionary missions and combat situation.
The deadly experience with IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the importance of well-armored vehicles, such as the Mine Resistant Armor Protected troop transports, designed to protect their occupants from the hidden explosives, he said.
As a result, the Corps now plans to buy a “commercial, off-the-shelf” six-wheeled troop carrier (Editors note...is this a mistake or is the current cabal at HQMC looking at a smaller troop carrier????) that has limited amphibious capability but is better able to protect its passengers from IEDs.
“This vehicle will spend 90 percent of its time on land,” Amos said. “If I had to go back into Iraq… I would not take the AAVs, I would take this vehicle.”
The general said four companies are offering wheeled vehicles that could meet the Corps’ requirement for the new vehicle, labeled ACV phase 1.
But, because the proliferation of longer-range, accurate land-defense weapons has forced them to consider launching amphibious operations from as far off shore as 100 miles, the Marines have to figure out how to get the ACV and the Marines it carries ashore. He suggested putting them on a vessel “that can come at high speed from 100 miles.”
Asked by Seapower what the Marines could use for that, Amos listed the landing craft air cushion (LCAC), the more capable ship-to-shore connector (SSC) that will replace the LCACs, the landing craft utility (LCU) and the joint high-speed vessel (JHSV). Although the LCACs and SSC can hit 40 knots on water, they could carry only one ACV. The LCU could carry several, but can only go 12 knots.
The JHSV can sail at 40 knots but cannot go all the way to the beach. But, Amos said, it does not have to. A stronger ramp is being developed that would allow the JHSV to offload ACVs close to the beach so it could swim ashore. The Navy is buying 10 JHSVs.
Hmm.

Maybe evil is too strong a word.  How about something suspicious is going on?

The good?

HQMC is finally coming to grips with how stupid they sound talking about having to develop a new ship to shore connector.  Additionally the idea of using JHSV's to transport ACVs to a launch point is a variation on a theme I've been harping about for a couple of years now.  The platform is different, I said do it with LCACs, but the JHSV will do.

The bad?

This is happening too late in his tenure to actually go forward.  I don't see how anyone can take the ACV industry day seriously.  This is the 8th time we've seen a start, stop, start routine from this Commandant on the ACV.  If I was a manufacturer interested in this program the first thing I would do is to reach out to Dunford to get his thoughts...barring that I'd talk to Gray, Conway or Mattis to get there feel.  Time is money and HQMC has been costing these corporations some serious time.

The reality?

Dunford will enter office with all the info he needs to make an expedited buy of the next ACV/MPC.  Will it be one of the MPC contenders?  A simplified EFV?  A new program (unlikely...patience has run out in the Marine Corps over this issue)...or will we see the AAV drastically upgraded?

Amos has become irrelevant.  Interviews with him are no longer valid.  He's run out his rope and now its next man up.  Dunford will have to decide how we proceed.  Last minute moves by his predecessor be damned.


6 comments :

  1. This is a sensible thing to do. Just buy more hovercraft to deliver armored vehicles on land directly at high speed. instead of asking armored vehicles to swim faster.

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    1. That's the cheap part. You'd also need more well-deck ships to carry/deploy the extra hovercraft.

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  2. So a six wheeled amphibious vehicle? Any bets that the Fuchs/Fox is the winner since the Army already has a bunch in the inventory?

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    1. not sure. i'm guessing thats an error but i'm reaching out to them to see whats up.

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  3. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  4. I'm a bit confused regarding the JHSV idea. If we're concerned about a contested anti-access environment:
    1. How close to shore is the drop-off point where the ACV departs the JSHV? Anything within 15 miles is line of sight, and certainly within the envelope of even current short range ASCMs.
    2. JHSV is built of aluminum, to commercial shipping standards. Why is JHSV considered more survivable as a connector, than the USN L-class amphibs that must remain somewhere beyond 65NM due to the missile threats. Ostensibly, USN warships should be able to withstand magnitudes more damage.
    3. JHSV is a USNS asset, and manned by civilian Merchant Mariners. Are we really going to have Navy Sailors in ships of war stay out in the protected bluewater, while we have civilian Mariners take the Marines ashore in cargo vessels. Maybe administrivia, but the union might have something to say, and as a Sailor, I would be professionally embarrassed.
    4. Forty knots capable and $214M per copy, JHSV is fast and relatively inexpensive compared to conventional amphibs. It's also lightly armed (crew served), and thin skinned. Aren't these the same characteristics of the much maligned LCS? JHSV is less armed or armored than LCS, how it it more "survivable" in a front line combat role?
    5. Will ACVs swim out of the belly of the amphib, then onto the ramp of the JHSV, transit, then down the ramp and ashore. I'm not an amphibious ops expert, but that seems to make a very hard mission even more difficult. Don't LCACs load internally?

    In short: if the Fleet can't come in close to shore, and the LCS can't survive in the modern threat environment, then neither can JHSV (nor helos or Ospreys). If we're going to put substantial combat power ashore in a well defended area, it will be a sequential operation preceded by SEAD, OCA, deep strikes on mil C2, heavy shore bombardment, etc. - the ole' number 6. Only then do we put Marines and Sailors in the boats. IMHO.

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