Thursday, July 17, 2014

Navy Matters Blog says take the amphibs away from the USMC.


Check this out from NMB...
If the Marines are out of the amphibious assault business then why do they still claim to need 38 large hull amphibious ships? If we’re not doing the big amphibious assaults, logic suggests that we can eliminate many of the amphibious ships. Sure, we’d probably want to retain a handful for lower end operations. Around 18 amphibious ships would allow us to operate two MEUs, one each in the Atlantic and Pacific. A three ship ARG requires nine ships to keep three deployed, hence, the total of 18. Quite a drop from 38 and quite a potential savings!

The Marines can’t have it both ways. If they’re out of the business then they don’t need the assets, resources, and budget. In fact, if they’re dropping down to light aviation-based assault one could legitimately wonder if the Army’s aviation assault capabilities aren’t sufficient and superior.
Read the whole thing here.

My take on things?

I am so tired of Marine leadership speaking out and not realizing the power of their words.

Navy Matters Blog is spot on.  I can't refute a thing that he's said, but I also know this.  We will continue to be in the "combat" and "forcible entry" business.  A few air wingers that don't know a thing about the REAL Marine Corps can't change that.

All this group of leaders has done is throw mud in the face of the Marines they supposedly lead and protect pet projects at the expense of the institution.

NOTE!  Let me be clear.  Navy Matters isn't saying to TAKE away the amphibs but that its a logical next step if we are to believe what General Mullen stated.


11 comments :

  1. This is based on comments from General Mullen who is a BG down in the Capabilities Development Directorate under an LG who is the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration. There is also a BG who heads the Futures Directorate (it's quite a bureaucracy).

    Futures Directorate, not capabilities, is concerned with strategy.

    Futures Mission:
    Enhance the current and determine the future Marine Corps strategic landscape by assessing
    plausible future security environments, developing and evaluating Marine Corps Service Concepts, and integrating these concepts into Naval, Joint, and other Service concepts in order to identify potential gaps and opportunities to inform future force development and enable conditions for future operational advantage.

    So I wouldn't invest too much in the comments of such a relatively low-positioned person in a directorate not concerned with strategy.

    organization as seen here.

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  2. Solomon, I appreciate that you understood me correctly. I'm not advocating cutting the Marines or their assets, just pointing out the logic of the situation they've created with their current emphasis on low end operations and aviation. Personally, I think we need a strong Marine Corps that is able to conduct forcible entry. The problem is that we don't have the assets (or doctrine!) to conduct such operations, currently. We (the Corps) need to do some serious thinking about what a future amphibious assault will look like, how it will be conducted, where it will occur (beach versus port), what types of organic capabilities the Marines should have (tanks, artillery, etc.), how we will transport the assets to the assault site, and so on. With a clear grasp of all that, we can identify the gaps in our equipment and doctrine and begin rebuilding an effective assault force. However, under current leadership none of that is likely to happen. Will the coming change in leadership change the focus? Hopefully, but we'll have to wait and see.

    There's also the matter of Navy cooperation and doctrine, as I've pointed out.

    For Don, this is not just one isolated, irrelevant General speaking out of turn. These same comments have been publicly stated by many Marine leaders up to and including the Commandant. You can agree or disagree with the direction but this is, clearly, the path the Corps is currently on. They may say they can still do assaults but the equipment, will, and doctrine just doesn't exist to do so and Gen. Mullen is simply stating that reality, as have other Marine leaders.

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    Replies
    1. Wrong.
      USMC Cannot Meet All Its Amphibious Needs, Top Marine Says
      The US Marine Corps cannot meet its amphibious assault needs with its current stable of ship-to-shore connectors, according to Commandant Gen. Jim Amos in a recent article he penned for the June edition of Proceedings Magazine. . . “Today, there is a significant gap in the planned surface-connector fleet inventory from FY17 to FY 26 that, in conjunction with our amphibious-ship shortfalls, will significantly limit the capacity for amphibious operations and must not be allowed to widen.”

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    2. The Commandant mentions three or four different types of "connectors",which are significantly less survivable in an A2/AD environment than large amphibs. Connectors allow for administrative movement to an objective, while amphibious assault vehicles enable maneuver while in contact with the enemy. Contact seems like a given during an "opposed" landing or "forcible entry" operation. Serious contact in any of those slow, lightly armored vessels is mass suicide of Flanders Fields proportions.

      Connectors may be more expendable than large amphibs, but they are not more survivable, and if that's the best idea we have to get across a defended beach - the nation's forcible entry options are limited.

      This shift is further reinforced by recent MAWTS and war fighting lab long range experiments featuring Ospreys, CLT(-), and F-35 (surrogates), as well as the emphasis on SPMAGTF. So, I concur with CNO that this is more than just one rogue GO.

      We need a strong Marine Corps that can fight its way up onto a defended beach, stick a knee in the enemy's chest, and a knife in his throat.

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    3. totally agree Trons Away.

      i've been watching those exercises and to be quite honest they make me wonder when Quantico legalized marijuana.

      the only silver lining to this whole mess is that the current cabal is enamored with these concepts but they have yet to gain favor with the wider Marine Corps. it does leave the question though. where does Dunford come down on all this?

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    4. Nobody has yet linked to a responsible MC statement "no more amphibious assaults."
      There's only an alleged assertion by a BG not involved in strategy.
      If it's out there, if it's "been publicly stated by many Marine leaders up to and including the Commandant," then let's see it.

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    5. Just to be clear, no argument that Amos is a pro-air putz, but here we're talking tactical doctrine, serious stuff. Got to get it right.

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    6. Don, as one example of many, MGen. Frank McKenzie did a CSIS Q&A in Oct '13 and made the same statements that the Marines are not in the business of conducting opposed beach landings. He also stated that the best way the Marines could fit into the AirSea Battle concept was as an expeditionary air force.

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    7. Pretty weak tea, hearsay only, so I'll take it that the MC has no tactical doctrine opposed to amphibious assaults. Therefore we can't conclude that Marines are officially out of the amphibious assault business. It is only some Marines who are going in a different direction.

      So apparently these pubs are still valid:

      Amphibious Operations
      Joint Publication 3-02, 10 August 2009
      Amphibious operations can be designed to achieve operation or campaign objectives in one swift stroke; comprise the initial phase of a campaign or major operation to establish a military lodgment; serve as a supporting operation to deny the use of an area or facilities; to fix enemy forces and attention; to outflank an enemy; or to support military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, humanitarian assistance, and civic assistance.

      Marine Corps Operations
      MCDP 1-0, 9 August 2011
      Amphibious Operations ..2-23

      Types of Amphibious Operations
      There are five types of amphibious operations, following in the order of likelihood:
      --Amphibious support to other operations.
      This type of support contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. It may include activities, such as security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil support, noncombatant evacuations operations, peace operations, recovery operations, and disaster relief.
      --Amphibious raid.
      Amphibious raids involve a swift incursion into or a temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal.
      --Amphibious assault.
      Amphibious assault involves the establishment of a landing force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
      --Amphibious withdrawal.
      Amphibious withdrawal involves the extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
      --Amphibious demonstration.
      Amphibious demonstrations involve a show of force conducted to deceive the enemy with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action (COA) unfavorable to him.

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  3. The Marine Corps got the Navy to build an aircraft carrier...LHA 6. Call it what you will but it is nothing more than a straight deck aircraft carrier from days past. It is larger than most every other carrier any other nation in the world is currently utilizing. The Marine Corps got the Navy to spend HUGE dollars to reconfigure the current LHD's for the F-35.
    I guess the amphib roots that have been bought and paid for are giving way to challenging the 101st Air Assualt Division for their job.

    We keep going further and further down the "air assualt" rabbit hole and soon we will not be able to see the light from whence we came and we will be too heavilly invested to buy our way back.

    In all my leadership and tactics classes while serving, the whole concept of the amphibious assault was for the sea borne to link up with the airborne. What will happen when there is no sea borne to link back to the sea? If we manage to slip a few Osprys into a LZ in a contested enviroment, how do we support? They become an island in a sea of bad. Add in a sea borne echelon and there is a pincher.

    I was an Embark Officer and I can see this is bad. Why can't officers whose careers have been dedicated to this concept see through the forest?

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  4. This time, we have a tendency to got the subsequent problem clue: Batting figuresthat conjointly called Batting figures lexicon. First, we have a tendency to gonna search for additional hints to the Batting figures problem. Then we'll collect all the desired data and for resolution Batting figures problem . within the final, we have a tendency to get all the potential answers for the this problem definition.

    ReplyDelete

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