Thursday, January 22, 2015

JLTV unsuitable for USMC operations.

Thanks to Jonathan for the link!

Hummer recap

via Janes
Key Points
· The size and deployability of JLTVs is questioned by the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation
· Testers found that USMC amphibious assaults would suffer from the added time needed to deploy JLTVs
Pentagon testers have found that Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) prototypes are slow to deploy from ship to shore and, therefore, leaves US Marine Corps (USMC) units "vulnerable to threats".
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation annual report on the previous year's testing, released on 20 January, found that during developmental test/operational test (DT/OT) events, USMC units with JLTVs were able to execute amphibious assault missions, but were hampered by the new trucks' lack of deployability.
"The JLTVs have large visual signature and their slow manoeuvre time from ship to shore prevents a Marine Expeditionary Unit from executing assault missions with tactical surprise, increases the time to close combat power ashore, and renders the unit vulnerable to threats," the report said.
"Testing showed that JLTVs are slower to load, prepare for fording, and transition to manoeuvre ashore than HMMWV [Humvees]" that they are meant to replace, the document said. Testers explained that the issues were caused by the JLTV's overall larger size (vehicle suspensions are dropped so they can better fit in amphibious ships) and "delays that occur while awaiting suspension mode, and other vehicle adjustments" such as adjusting tyre pressure.
A spokesman for the Army Program Executive Office for Combat Support & Combat Service Support declined to comment on whether the office has developed a plan to address deficiencies outlined in the report.
The DT/OT events occurred in April 2014, with US Army and USMC units using CH-47F Chinook and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters for an air assault mission, and a USMC unit using Landing Craft Utility vessels for amphibious assault missions.
Testers found that units with JLTVs - and organic armour assets - can execute air assault missions.
However, "the three JLTV contractor vehicles were more difficult to rig, de-rig, and load weapons due to vehicle height and lack of vehicle handholds and footholds than HMMWV," the report said. "They had limited space to carry crew, mission essential equipment, weapons, and their sustainment load because of the small interior compartment."
It should be obvious to all that the USMC is looking for a graceful exit from this program.

This study is just another excuse to do what should have been done two years ago.  I'm not a fan of Textron but since they teamed with Granite, the upgrade option to the Humvee is a no brainer.

Put the JLTV out of its misery and sole source an upgrade for Marine Corps Humvees.  If nothing else it'll take another piece off the table when it comes to the procurement trainwreck.


  1. Given the amphibious-assault requirement of the Marine Corps it makes little sense for it and the Army to go after a common Humvee replacement.

    1. no it makes perfect sense. the problem was the requirements. they tried to make the HUMVEE into a combat car. they uparmored it and raised it. going from ship to shore ...especially when you consider space aboard ship is what is dooming the vehicle for USMC service. once on land it becomes alot better. the solution is simple. the upgraded HUMVEE does the work in most situation and for certain roles you buy the JLTV. it'll be a much smaller buy overall but it will allow tailoring of the vehicle to meet needs.

    2. Instead of buying the JLTV, why not just keep the Oshkosh M-ATV? It's the lightest of the Class I MRAPS and really only a few ton's more (at most) than the JLTV, also, you can easily bet that JLTV's would get add-on armor packages that would bring their final combat weight to even with the M-ATV. Why spend more money when part of the solution is already fielded?

    3. Isn't this the type of thing that should have been noticed BEFORE they started bending metal? I mean honestly this is too dumb for words. If you know you have a certain size space on a ship, then you build to that. Too weird.

    4. One of the JLTV variants is based off the M-ATV. the L-ATV.

  2. The Granite/Textron HMMWV recap is by far the best out there; they don't just add a shallow V side skirt or raise the height of the suspension, they completely replace the crew capsule with a new one.

    They've had it around for years and have been working with other companies, tweaking it ever since to fit different duties:

    Navistar wants MaxxPro MRAPS to take over Command and Control duties the M113 once did, I think ADS just shot them in the foot.

  3. This comment has been removed by the author.

  4. It's got four tires and it's roughly 'jeep size' (which is to say larger than a pickup, smaller than an APC or Armored Car).

    It's not going to survive 7.62mm API or RPG-7 in anything like a sustained volley because tracks like the BMP won't. Attempting to make it do so will cause the ground footprint weight to go right to China.

    The Military overengineers what should be simple on the basis of: "We'd rather walk to the objective (or out of the airlanded situation) than be instantly mobile and able to DRIVE to the sound of gunfire. Or away from it, (at an LZ) at speed."

    Right now that level of capability comes only in militarized golf carts like the Gator and light jeeps like the German Wolf as the sole systems which can be driven off an internal load helo transport.

    That's stupid. Because even if you have to assault by foot, at least you can carry a helluva lot more gear and ammo and heavy weapons if you've got wheels to get to your leapoff line. Draw a radius around ANY objective within 5 minute boot range and count the number of LZs that have to be overwatched.

    Now do the same for an LZ with a 30mph drive speed and the same 5 minute window. See how much bigger the circle is and thus _How Much Harder_ you make it for your enemy to just jump you as soon as you start to put down? We're talking mortars and RCLs as well as small arms here people.

    The Marines are too big for their mission if they are thinking this way. The Army always has been. Not Good Enough is the enemy of New Options Defeating Predictability.

    We need a Stupid Seeking Missile.

  5. Off topic but check out Milan vs MRAP....good footage

  6. This is one of the foreseen consequences of "MRAP-izing" a fleet of utility vehicles. The result is that the weight and high ground PSI make it unsuitable for many missions, to include anything Marine related. The size is another problem. The Oshkosh L-ATV, a derivative of the M-ATV, is massive.

    Anybody that has been around the M-ATV and vehicles like it knows they cannot practically replace HMMWVs. They're designed to be just what they are: MRAPs for COIN operations. Not service-wide utility vehicles.

  7. The MECV program, that the Textron capsule among others was made for, was canceled because it was too expensive. The recent HMMWV upgrade program was cancelled because it was too expensive. All of the solutions offered to fix HMMWVs are either too expensive, or the parts they do not replace became the weakest link in the vehicle reliability. This was evident in the Textron vehicle, like other contractors put together a great effort but were unable to fix all of the problems. It is like trying to make a Ford Fiesta into an F250 for $45,000. Just spend $50,000 and buy the F250.

    The Marines will buy between 5-6,000 JLTVs. this will not replace the entire HMMWV fleet. It will protect the operators at MRAP levels and allow them mobility similar to or better than a HMMWV, at way better reliability. This is not the usual fiction created to support programs like the EFV or F35. A purpose built armored vehicle with tires that are not overloaded is more reliable than a utility truck with aftermarket steel bolted on and the tires at their limit.

    The JLTV is tested in comparison to the HMMWV, but in actuality it is closer to an M-ATV / HMMWV hybrid in terms of capability and protection. It will come with new transportability challenges and other issues that critics will jump on. It is unfortunate that the article stated the Marines did not have sufficient room for their gear, but I can not imagine it is much worse than a crammed HMMWV. The fact is that MRAPs are crap for mobility / transportability, and HMMWVs are no longer trusted in the field due to reliability issues that can not be "upgraded" without a 90% replacement. All of these vehicles are here to stay, have their role, and there is no one slam dunk joint vehicle program that can satisfy the needs of every mission.

  8. I wonder how much the extra utility is worth considering you need a whole new supply chain for parts and maintenance to support the JLTV. For what it is worth, unless the CH-53K comes on line with seriously more lift (don't know the K lift capacity), the Marine Corps is in a pinch when it comes to help lifting these vehicles. Whatever happened to the Humvee chimney IED protection? Like had been said before, MRAPs are massive and terrain limited, expensive to maintain, tough to work on without contractors because the parts are essentially custom, and will weigh out a ship long before cubing it out (a 4x4 MRAP weighs more that a 7 ton and carries much less personnel and equipment - how many MRAPs/JLTVs would you need to lift even the CLT?) Clearly, a mix is the proper answer, but I don't see what the JLTV brings to the table more than the forward positioned MRAPs that are already closer to the fight. Maybe the solution is to look at intra-theater assets to get MRAP/MATVs to whatever fight we need in limited numbers.

  9. Here is a link to the Humvee blast chimney:


Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.