Thursday, March 26, 2020

We can read it for ourselves. USMC FORCE DESIGN 2030.


Note.  I'm drinking this in and posting stuff that catches my eye while I'm reading it.


2.   WHOA!!!!  He is NOT CONFIDENT that we have a clear understanding of the F-35's capabilities!!!  That is fucking HUGE!
I am not convinced that we have a clear understanding
yet of F-35 capacity requirements for the future
force. As a result, the Service will seek at least one
external assessment of our Aviation Plan relative to
NDS objectives and evolving naval and joint warfighting
As described in Congressional testimony, our continued
pilot shortfalls are a factor we must consider and either
scale programs of record accordingly or implement a
sustainable, affordable solution. Other Services face
similar shortfalls. This issue has recruiting, training,
and retention factors – as well as fiscal and industrial
base factors – that we must consider in reconciling the
growing disparity between numbers of platforms and
numbers of aircrew.
3.   Uh oh.  Cuts coming to the ACV and the JLTV...I think....
 While the decrease in the number of infantry battalions
is clearly articulated in the Phase II material, the absence
of a major reduction in ground tactical combat vehicles
is inconsistent with the systems-oriented reduction
discussed above. DC CD&I will need to assess existing
ground tactical vehicle programs of record and
recommend appropriate adjustments to approved
acquisition objectives.
4.   Ain't no changing his mind about retaining tanks.  Berger says the US Army can do it.
 We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this
capability, despite its long and honorable history in
the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our
highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground
armor capability will continue to be provided by the
U.S. Army.
I wonder what his meaning is here.  Is he saying that its an Army capability that we should not attempt to mirror?  If so then he's using the lessons of Desert Storm when Army tanks was supporting Marine Infantry.  As much as I hate the idea ... lets face it.  It's solid.

5.  This is expected but will push up the cost of the CH-53K to unmanageable levels.  The MV-22 will probably die as soon as the Army gets their tiltrotor working....
Divestment of three heavy helicopter squadrons
Based on analysis by our aviation subject-matter-experts,
five squadrons provide sufficient capacity to satisfy our
requirements as well as our future force as described
in approved naval concepts.
Divestment of three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons
Given the reduction of infantry battalion capacity and
associated combat support, the remaining tiltrotor force
should be sufficient to our needs.
6.   Follow the money.  It's always about the money and the Marine Corps just saved the taxpayer a huge amount (although the pandemic response makes it look like a SINGLE drop in the bucket).
 “The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a
potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards
equipment modernization, training modernization, and
force development priorities.”
The terrible thing?  The US Army and now the US Marines have done some SAVAGE cutting but I believe it will ultimately be for naught.  The water faucet was turned on in Washington and the bean counters will still come calling for even MORE cuts.

7.   This is huge.  Berger isn't sure that the redesigned Infantry Bn will work...
Redesign of the infantry battalion
I am not confident that we have adequately assessed all
of the implications of the future operating environment
on the proposed structure of our future infantry battalion.
While I fully support redesign of the infantry battalion
in principle, I remain unconvinced that the specific
proposed new construct makes the force more capable
of Distributed Operations. We must conduct more
live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed
design results in a truly DO-capable force. I would
like to see intensive further analysis of this proposed
new structure during Phase III.
Kinda putting the cart before the horse huh?  Cuts before he's sure of the new design?  I MUST be missing something here.

Increase in Light Armored Reconnaissance
While I have repeatedly stated that all-domain
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be
a critical element of any future contingency, I remain
unconvinced that additional wheeled, manned armored
ground reconnaissance units are the best and only
answer – especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need
to see more evidence during Phase III to support this
conclusion before engaging in an expansion of our
existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars
in procurement funds towards the acquisition of an
Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV).
I need to drink this in.  First impression is that this dude is making a HUGE gamble and taking the Marine Corps in a direction that will set it back to an almost pre-WW2 status in our war machine.

Quite honestly it will be aviation centric to the point of being irrelevant in ground combat, tailored so much to the sea battle that it mimics Navy capabilities and so devoid of any relevance in any domain to make it utterly redundant.

In other words I fear that if we follow this plan we could see the Marine Corps sunset.

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