📽️It's about speed and agility...#RoyalMarines have been testing lightweight vehicles for rapid movement across the battlefield, as commandos look to add extra mobility for raiding missions that are increasingly a focus of the UK's Commando Forces.https://t.co/lBXb2LdqrG pic.twitter.com/TFIBZbHEO3
— Royal Marines (@RoyalMarines) July 23, 2021
PLA's new MLRS.
— The Dead District (@TheDeadDistrict) July 24, 2021
Does anybody know designation?#PLA #China #MLRS pic.twitter.com/K78YOlCqSC
via 19fortyfive
The trouble with this acquisition strategy is that the Sea Services look like they are going all in for LAW, even though it appears to be flawed both technically and operationally. At 14 knots, LAW will be a slow ship. It would take one to two weeks to make the trip from Hawaii to the first island chain, even if it had the range. Being slow also means that if detected, it would have little chance of evading attack or, lacking adequate armaments, of defending itself. With respect to self-defense, LAW would be vulnerable to mine warfare when approaching the shore.
Supporters argue that because it is relatively small and slow, and able to use its shallow draft to land on unguarded beaches, LAW will be able to avoid detection by hiding among the great number of small cargo and fishing vessels that operate in the littoral waters of the Indo-Pacific theater. This assumes that most of these vessels will not run for cover when war breaks out.
The LAW operating concept also fails to appreciate how rapidly surveillance technologies of all kinds are proliferating in the region. Over the next decade, China may be capable of creating a robust network of surveillance assets and supporting analytics to find, fix and target ships as small as LAW. There is no worse combination of attributes when it comes to the survivability of warships than slow and visible.
"The current drills a short distance away could be considered a routine exercise, but I think they're specially targeted [at Taiwan]," Du added. "Taiwan is the target.""How much time would the U.S. really have?" Du said, in the event China decided to launch a wave of attacks to invade the island.He added: "Before U.S. forces arrive, we will have completed all our combat tasks. They will have no chance to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict."
I've stated the same. Anyone that disagrees is just being foolish and hasn't looked at a map. The only way we can viably defend Taiwan is if we have forces on the island to act as a tripwire...along with the stated intent to go nuclear should landings be attempted.
Barring that, the defense of Taiwan is a fantasy.
#PolishArmy' 🇵🇱 #Rosomak #IFV with #ZSSW-30 turret.
— The Dead District (@TheDeadDistrict) July 23, 2021
The #Spike LR2 #ATGM launchers installed on the turret.
(c) militarysta pic.twitter.com/IWnfJr4cKI
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| U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II aircrafts with Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, prepare to load U.S. Marine Corps High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems with 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 at Bundaberg, Queensland, Australia, July 21, 2021. TS21, the ninth iteration and conducted since 2005, occurs biennially across Northern Australia. Australian, U.S. and other multinational partner forces use Talisman Sabre to enhance interoperability by training in complex, multi-domain operations scenarios that address the full range of Indo-Pacific security concerts. |
