Does the saga of the EFV make you want to pound walls?
Does the idea that the USMC wasted 24 years developing an armored vehicle only to get a big bill out of the whole thing upset you?
Does the thought that the US Navy can get an airplane (P-8) into service in a shorter time frame than it will take the Marine Corps to potentially get the Marine Personnel Carrier into service make you scratch your head in frustration?
Then saddle up to this old article from National Defense Magazine. Just a tidbit, the link is here.
“It’s much easier to detune current capabilities than to start over,” said Michael Bolon, senior vice president of Navy and Marine Corps programs at General Dynamics Land Systems.General Dynamics proposed a detuned EFV.
The company has asked the Marine Corps to give the program another chance and procure just 200 of the tanks, enough for two expeditionary brigades, and use leftover money to upgrade hundreds of current assault amphibious vehicles. Under this proposal, the EFV could enter production within two years and the government could avoid $184 million in cancellation costs, Bolon told reporters on Jan. 25.
The Defense Department already has spent more than $3 billion on the program, which recently saw the testing of four prototypes off the coast of California. The success of these experiments has General Dynamics saying it could shave millions from the unit cost of the EFV if the government were to keep the program.
Without changes, one EFV would cost the Marine Corps $17 million. Bolon said that General Dynamics has provided the Pentagon with modifications that could bring that per-unit cost down to less than $10 million. These savings would result from reducing speed and weapon capabilities and equipping the EFV with a simplified hydraulic system, Bolon said.
The Marine Corps had a chance to still win but for some reason (whether from the Pentagon or from inside the Marine Corps itself) chose not to pursue the option.
Excuse me. I need a drink.
NOTE: The Marine Corps did everything right in the approach to the EFV. They developed doctrine first, then a concept of operations, then drew up requirements, put it out to industry and then selected General Dynamics to build the thing. The problem came in the implementation. We lacked a sense of urgency and did not monitor GD closely enough. They (I'm making this assertion I have no proof) kept coming back with the "we're close" and because the capability was so desired the program muddled along. The problem is the way that the Marine Corps does armored vehicle development. It trudges along with a new vehicle coming along once every 50 or so years. Consider the timeline of the LVT. First developed prior to WW2 the first designs were modified and kept in service until the 1950's. The next gen LVT-5's served from around the end of Korea over to the end of Vietnam. The LVTP-7/AAV will serve until around 2020 or so. I know you get tired but the comparison for the US Army is the M-44, M-75, M-113, M-114, Bradley, improved Bradley, Stryker, improved Stryker and soon the AMPV and the GCV. The Army has a much more robust armored development system. If we won't keep pace by developing new vehicles then purchases of new built designs of existing vehicles with modern upgrades should become standard operating procedure.
Did the EFV ever really have a chance? Was it hopelessly too expensive from the start? Was it mismanaged? Would it cost less to have multiple vehicles each doing their own thing than to have a super vehicle trying to do everything?
ReplyDeletei'm about to update the post with some more thoughts. standby.
DeleteI think the P-8 is an unjust comparison. The "prototype" 737 first flew 46 years ago and thousand of examples and possible modifications had flown before the P-8 model was offered to the Navy. Stretch, trim and adjust and you are done. "All" it needed was the mil package.
ReplyDeleteA more apt look at failed development is a replacement "light weight" Ma Deuce. That one has been going on for over 70 years.
the P-8 is the perfect example. its a fusion of off the shelf items cobbled together to form an effective maritime patrol plane. because its off the shelf it was assembled and put into service in short order. the same could apply to the MPC if we acted with urgency. we swim them soon, we blast test them, we declare a winner and we get them into production next year...not 20??...as it is if memory serves we're still looking at that vehicle hitting the fleet 5 maybe 10 years from now.
DeleteSo, the 737 had 90% of the performance the P-8 required and just needed bits and pieces hung on and in it.
DeleteWhere is the commercial off-the-shelf vehicle that performs as well as 70% of the EFV requirements?
Before you can adopt something off the shelf, it has to be on the shelf.
Did the Corps really develop the doctrine by itself or in concert with the Navy? The doctrine was flawed. That in my view is the main reason driving up EFV requirements and costs. The entire notion that the ships have to stay 12 miles offshore because it's too dangerous but at the same time the battle space is prepared enough for an amphibious assault is simply ridiculous.
ReplyDeleteIt's the long distance that drove the speed requirement. That resulted in a 2,700hp engine. MBT's that weigh almost double make do with 1,500hp engines. Throw in all the other complexity in making the thing water plane to do 45km/h and the doctrine is exactly why the vehicle was never going to be affordable. It was both flawed at conception and also lacked a focus on affordability.
Another major flaw is putting that much weight and complexity into a vehicle that is going to spend the vast majority of it's time ashore to operate as a IFV. If the main consideration was the IFV role, along with protection, then I humbly suggest the water speed requirement was incompatible with the other requirements given a reasonable cost. That also includes maintenance.
well of course it was developed with the Navy. the Navy and Marine Corps are the original joint force after all. the 12 mile limit from what i understand of it was developed because it gave defenses enough time to identify, track and kill incoming anti-ship missiles. the idea that it would spend the majority of its time onland is also a misnomer. i'd say a 50/50 split was envisioned. i've seen slides (and i'm really trying to find them) that showed operational maneuver from the sea by passing fortifications taking rivers inland to a spot near the objective, transitioning to land mode and attacking...quite honestly it was really ahead of its time and its a shame it couldn't be made to work. imagine fighting in the Philippine island chain...how about Indonesia? instead of waiting for LCAC's or landing craft, the enemy could be pursued over the numerous water obstacles that dot that land scape/ocean scape. if the EFV worked it would be an all star in the Pacific. again. too bad.
DeleteI say this is one of the biggest problems facing the US military procurement system. When to say that's it, we stop this program or let's buy the 80% solution but no, we have to get everything and the kitchen sink included.
ReplyDeleteWould want to know how GD can come back and say we can now do it for 10 million instead of 17? What was let go and can USMC still get a viable system? If yes, then do it for 10 million a piece. I am sure most of our weapons procured could be on time and on budget if DoD would be happy to get the 80% functional hardware instead of the gold plated 100% hardware.
i'm wondering if GD isn't still offering that as a viable solution. an EFV without the complex hydraulics and hydroplaning with say a 700 hp engine would still be a beast. the only thing that confuses me is the inclusion of the weapon system in the price reduction. does that mean that it won't have the Mk44 as part of its weapons fit? i could live with that but i wonder why that piece of the pie would be so pricey.
Deleteadditonally i wonder why its taking so long for them to come out with the RFP for the ACV.