First off, Iraq wasn't a failure any more than the War of 1812 was a failure, or the Civil War was a failure. Iraq has been on its own for a while now, and yes the killing is on an uptick. Iran is a right bastard to have for a neighbor. Peace is that brief moment of time where everyone pauses to reload....Its been a long time since I've actually cheered when it comes to a post on the military and its been a positive story.
I wonder how the British Army felt after Yorktown? Were there calls for reforms? Was blame passed about? Or did someone realize, "You know, fighting an expensive foreign war a long distance from our lines of supply is never a recipe for success."
But in terms of what the US Military could do, and did, in Iraq, was definitely a "success" in terms of kicking ass and taking names in six weeks, then spending almost a decade trying to rebuild some semblance of representative government. It's like a carpenter with one tool, a sledgehammer. Great for knocking down walls, but just not the right tool for doing finish work on cabinetry. But when your only tool is a sledgehammer, that is what you use.
Afghanistan, same story as Vietnam. We win in every engagement, but we are supporting a corrupt government that everyone knows is corrupt.
In terms of actual fighting, we've kicked ass and always kicked ass. If you want us to do something other than fighting, like Somalia, Lebanon, the rebuilding of Iraq an Afghanistan, by the very definition of what Armies are, we kinda suck at that.
Much needed and spot on.
Sidenote: I still believe we have Flag Rank bloat and perhaps too many officers overall but that won't be solved till we thin the herd at the top.
There was extreme bravery and sacrifice in Vietnam, but the U.S. didn't win every battle. That myth still lingers on somehow. There are around 50 or so battles that the U.S. did not win in Vietnam. Here are some: -(13 August 1965): 76 American carrier aircraft launched attacks to destroy North Vietnamese air defense sites. 5 aircraft shot down, 7 damaged, 3 pilots killed. No enemy losses.
ReplyDelete-Air Battle (23 august 1967): A few MiGs on an attack on a group of 40 American fighters and bombers. They shoot down 3 Phantom jet fighters and an F-105 fighter-bomber, 8 American aviators captured or killed. Vietnamese loses: Zero.
-Attack on Firebase Mary Ann (28 march 1971): Viet Cong sappers launch a surprise attack on an American base, catching it by surprise and breaching its defences before the Americans could respond. 33 Americans were killed and 83 wounded, the deadliest attack on an American base during the war.
-The Battle for Hill 861 - In 1967, Bravo Company, 1st battalion, 9th Marines went to search for caves on Hill 861. After a skirmish, the company attacked up the hill without knowing that it had encountered a large enemy force. Most of Bravo was wiped out and the survivors were pinned down until rescued by Kilo company that night.
-The Attack on Da Nang - North Vietnamese Army (NVA) sappers infiltrated this airbase on July 1, 1965. They destroyed three large C-130 transport aircraft, three F-102 fighters, and damaged three more F-102s. The sappers escaped leaving behind one dead.
-The Kingfisher Battle near Con Thien - In 1967, "Operation Kingfisher" was launched to destroy NVA forces based just south of the DMZ. On Sept. 21st, the 2nd battalion, 4th Marines began a "search and destroy" mission and quickly encountered the entrenched 90th NVA regiment. The Marines lacked tank support because recent rains limited road mobility, while the dense vegetation and close proximity of the enemy restricted air and artillery support. After a day-long battle, the Marines had suffered at least 16 dead and 118 wounded while trying to break out of the enemy's kill zone. The battalion withdrew at dusk, although flee may be a better term since 15 dead Marines were left behind. Details are sketchy, but the battalion didn't return to collect its dead until three weeks later. Veterans of the battle state they lost 34 KIA that day.
-The Ambush at Hoc Mon - In 1968, 92 American soldiers of C Company, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division began a search-and-destroy mission near Saigon. They were looking for a Viet Cong force that had been firing rockets into their Tan Son Nhut Air Base. As they rushed along a road without flank security to catch up with their battalion, they ran into an ambush. Within eight minutes, 49 American soldiers were dead or dying, and 29 were wounded.
-The Battle of the Slopes - A company of American paratroopers was searching for the NVA in rough terrain when it was attacked by a large force. It suffered 76 KIA as it fled, with two platoons wiped out.
-The Battle of Dai Do - A Marine Corps infantry battalion was mauled and forced to retreat after a disorganized attempt to dislodge a large North Vietnamese force near the DMZ. The Marines suffered 81 KIA and 397 wounded while killing hundreds of NVA. Accounts of this action are hidden within reports of operations in region of Dong Ha.
-The Battle of Ong Thanh - After minor enemy contact the previous day, a battalion commander led some 150 American soldiers single-file into the bush to destroy the enemy. They ran into an NVA regiment with some 1400 men. Alpha company was wiped out in 20 minutes, and by sundown, 59 American soldiers lay dead with 75 wounded
well i can tell you that from the ground forces perspective (and i know you can dither) the greater point remains. the war was won on the ground. the losses occurred when the mission pushed from combat to nation building or some other flimsy unattainable goal. thats what AM is getting at.
ReplyDeleteEric Palmer, I'd hazard a guess that you and I classify "battle" differently. All of those examples are what I would consider a "small engagement" save for the Battle of Dai Do which involved a BN level operation.
ReplyDeleteI pulled this from wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle#Characteristics
Battles are, on the whole, made up of a multitude of individual combats, skirmishes and small engagements within the context of which the combatants will usually only experience a small part of the events of the battle's entirety. To the infantryman, there may be little to distinguish between combat as part of a minor raid or as a major offensive, nor is it likely that he anticipates the future course of the battle; few of the British infantry who went over the top on the first day on the Somme, July 1, 1916, would have anticipated that they would be fighting the same battle in five months' time. Conversely, some of the Allied infantry who had just dealt a crushing defeat to the French at the Battle of Waterloo fully expected to have to fight again the next day (at the Battle of Wavre).
The US military is "like a carpenter with one tool, a sledgehammer. Great for knocking down walls, but just not the right tool for doing finish work on cabinetry. But when your only tool is a sledgehammer, that is what you use."
ReplyDeleteI saw a talk on this very subject on TED
https://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace
I don't think he has the right answers but the message is the same, when it comes to defeating the enemy in battle, the US is the best, easily.
The decision on when, how and where to use the military comes from the politicians. They need to understand what the military are good at, and, not so good at. Lessons from history were forgotten, the results ... messy.
not a big fan of "Ted Talks" but they do seem popular. one thing that does upset me a bit more than i care to admit is that civilian leadership of the military has led to civilians issuing orders to the military and instead of being honest and saying, no we can't do that or we can do that but it will cost x amount of dollars and 10 years, we have flag ranks simply saying yes sir and trying to do the impossible.
Deletebuilding a functioning western style democracy in the Middle East? mission impossible but we tried it in Iraq and AFghanistan, tried to help backwards nations in Africa and even have nations in the Pacific that have age long rivalries that we're getting tossed in the middle of.
enough of the bullshit. let the military bust things and kill people and let NGO's and Diplomats handle the rest.
This statement :
ReplyDelete"Afghanistan, same story as Vietnam. We win in every engagement, but we are supporting a corrupt government that everyone knows is corrupt."
This is a fundamental mis-reading of the purpose of insurgency and asymmetric warfare.
Insurgents aren't interested, primarily, in 'winning' a tactical engagement. That is beside the point. If they happen to 'win', then it is a PR score, but the goal is into inflict casualties and damage to assets against the enemy.
IEDs, snipers, rocket attacks, firefights are intended to wear down the enemy until the enemy grows weary and withdraws. We have expended hundreds of billions of dollars chasing dudes in robes and sandals, yet it is we who are reducing our forces, not the enemy.
Look at the Camp Bastion attack: 18 insurgents dead, 1 captured. Do we chalk that up as a win for our side? Nope. Those taliban were willing to exchange their lives in order to inflict casualties and a disproportionate amount of damage upon their enemy. They destroyed 6 Harriers, damaged two more and killed two Marines because the point was to make us look vulnerable ('we can get to you anywhere') and exploit our own arrogance.
Did our troops fight bravely? Yes, there is no question, but to what end?
Is either Iraq or Afghanistan transformed into a modern, democratic state? Holding elections does not a democracy make. These are still primitive, tribal and superstitious societies where 'corruption' and religious fervor count for more than anything.
Our soldiers fought bravely, but the failure of Iraq and Afghanistan belong squarely upon the officer corps' and the senior political leadership's failure to comprehend what our enemies intended and whether our state goals were achievable.
Amer Merc might want to claim Iraq as a victory, but if you compare it to what the neo-con Bush admin wanted from Iraq, a compliant vassal state that yielded its energy reserves, wasn't a military threat to us our our allies and a convenient place to move our military bases from the Gulf, we fell short. It is a net exporter of not just oil, but also Shia militants which may become more dangerous than Saddam was. Saddam was easy to control, Shia insurgents tend to have a destabilizing effect.
i contend that fighting counter insurgencies are not a real military mission. quite honestly i label them as police activity.
Deletethe fact that Special Forces specializes in the art is ok, but i consider it a mission other than war. stack onto all this the fact that the US govt decided to nation build AFTER all military objectives had been completed (to the point where it was stated that less than 100 AQ member remained in Afghanistan) and you begin to understand the problem with these shifting war priorities.
I agree and disagree ;)
DeleteI like to think of warfare as a spectrum and the kind of conventional warfare our military exists to fight is found on an entirely different part of the spectrum from where insurgencies are found.
Galula contended that the counter-guerrilla force should be very low-tech and essentially nearly like guerrillas they fought.
A modern, mechanized Army is ill-suited for police actions. It should be conducted by a cross between gendarmes and light infantry forces. And not what we call 'Light Infantry' these days, with Rangers doing helicopter raids and then dusting off, but a real light, foot-mobile infantry that moves at the same pace as the enemy and isn't road-bound. You can't surprise the enemy if you move by motor vehicles and helicopters. We don't even have infantry like that any more. Special Forces A-teams can be like that, but even that is on such a small scale.
Thomas P.M Barnett had the idea that the military should be split into two groups: Leviathan and SysAdmin. Leviathan would be the part that breaks shit and whoops a lot of ass while SysAdmin would be the nation-building constabulary force that would clean up the mess and reintegrate the newly conquered back into polite Global society. While problematic, it was thought provoking.
It made me think that perhaps SOCOM could be a fifth branch and that it should raise 30 or so light infantry battalions that would be a mix of old-fashioned infantry and gendarmes that would specialize in OOTW. Get away from all the direct-action, door kicker stuff and get back to the A-Team unconventional force that works alongside foreign militaries or guerrillas.
Many have stated that a chance was missed during GW1 to topple Sadam.
ReplyDeleteI believe it is a good example of the use of military power with a well defined and realistic set of objectives.
The trouble is that success emboldens the politicians to use the military more often and with less care. Shortly after GW1 came Somalia.
As you said Sol, it's up to the Flag ranks to be honest about what they can and can't do.
Paralus,
ReplyDeleteSupporting a government that doesn't have the "mandate from heaven" is where we messed up in China and Vietnam. War is politics by other means, we impressed upon the enemy our will for a representative democracy. Trusting the Iraqis and Afghans to make good on that Democracy is foolish, then again we only lasted 87 years from founding to civil war ourselves...
But either way, in terms of a political outcome that can be defined as some sort of "success" we have achieved that. Whether that is sustainable in the long run is much like the Shah of Iran, maybe not.
That's a gross oversimplification of a far more complex idea of Clausewitz, but I digress. Plus you seem to be saying it backwards, that the political circumstance have arisen from the success of our warfighting.
DeleteInstalling and propping up corrupt governments does not lead to anything good for us. And while yes, militarily we succeeded in imposing our will upon those who were dumb enough to take us on in a straight up fight, but we failed miserably in the grander scheme of trying to impose Western democracy upon religiously fervent tribal societies who have no interest in producing a civil society capable of nurturing representative gov't.
Now, our nation had a weird path to democracy and I don't think the US democracy of 1840 would be recognizable to the people of 2014, so who knows whether it will truly take root in Iraq or Afghanistan. I fear all we have done is created Potemkin villages on a national scale.
We both agree, however, that only time will tell.
Paralus, if you want to impose western style democracy on a foreign culture, you have to do it the way the British did, with an empire and cultural adaptation over generations. That ended up in India and Malaysia. You could draw parallels to Japan and South Korea with the US. But last I checked no one wanted permanent basing in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
ReplyDeleteAs far as a gross oversimplification, Clausewitz would note that Napoleon's political victories weren't permanent either.