Wednesday, July 23, 2014

An early "Lessons Learned" from the Israeli/Hamas conflict.



While many of you know that I consider the Israeli/Hamas conflict a sideshow to the world changing battle going on in the Ukraine, its still worth the time to do an early "lessons learned".

My take away?

1.  Armor matters.
The idea of Light Infantry/Special Ops etc... running around in heavy jeep type vehicles and being able to hook and jab with the enemy is a falsehood.  If you consider Gaza and extrapolate the fighting with some of the mega cities located in the Pacific...like Manila, Singapore etc...you come up with idea that armor matters.  Additionally vehicle protection systems like Trophy can make a difference.  But here's the kicker.  Like the Israeli's experienced we're going to have to work out different exit drills that will take our infantry farther away from their transports.  Greater dispersion of the infantry from their vehicles will make communication even more important.  I haven't seen any papers or writings on the subject but we need to get to work on it asap.

2.  Precision fires matter.
Much to my consternation, it appears that the days of calling in a grid square and having the cannon cockers destroy it are long past.  The Israelis are using their stocks of Spike missiles at an alarming rate.  The few times that they've used traditional cannon fire on targets its been a public relations nightmare with the "haters" in the media pumping up any death or injury as a war crime instead of a side affect of that thing we all know as the tragedy of combat.  But I'm especially talking about the use of naval guns here.  From my understanding they were used one time and the results were less than desirable.  We need to learn from that and adjust accordingly.

3.  In urban fighting airpower takes a back seat.
The IAF is the best in the region, some would say one of the best in the world.  But in this fight they're taking a back seat to the ground forces.  Is it because of the ROE?  Is it because of a lack of intel?  Or is it because they're just not the right tool for this fight?  I don't know.  What I do know is that at the end of the day its up to mechanized infantry along with tanks, artillery (precision and to a limited degree indirect), engineers and the rest of the ground combat element to do the majority of the hookin' and jabbin' in this fight.

This is what I'm seeing.  I might be seeing it wrong but it appears that the quantity and quality of your ground forces will be an important consideration for future fights.

NOTE:  Upcoming post.  What exactly is Light Infantry!  Is US military light infantry different from other nations?  Does anyone actually have Light Infantry units anymore?  And why Special Operations IS NOT light infantry!

9 comments :

  1. Good post, IMO.

    Regarding your #1: Armor will likely matter yet for a long time. But so will light infantry and SOF. Different capabilities and different roles. Don't discount us guys with the dirty boots and light (or no) vehicles. Just recognize the limits, and apply each unit to an appropriate task when possible. The infantry forces operating in Aza include light units. Unless something has radically changed since the 80s (and before), all IDF infantry are drilled on operating as light infantry as well as mounted or armored. Used to be that some emphasized the light and fast role more. That used to be the competition between Golani and Paratroops. And, while SOF clearly have their limitations in large scale operations; they also have irreplaceable capabilities. And if an armored commander still wants good intel or even needs help in some sorts of a jam, he still needs the infantry to do the job.

    #3: The IAF is especially limited by ROEs and plain humanistic sensibilities. In the past two weeks they've called off many, many missions when they arrived on station and found civilians in the way. Can't always be avoided, of course; but they really have been hampered by human shields.

    Overall, I think your observations are good ones.

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    1. don't get me wrong. i think light infantry rules, and that most SOF units are basically just light infantry that has more entry skills (even though they all revert to helicopter insertion 99.9% of the time). having said that light infantry has its limitations in the type of fights i see going forward.

      many of the futurist thought we would see Afghanistan type fights. i think they're being proven wrong. instead we're seeing terrorist groups or rebels that have technologically advanced weaponry that will negate the old special ops of either getting massive firepower on them while they're surprised or falling back and calling for fires when they run into a nut too tough to crack.

      no we're going to be heading into fights with enemies that will have the knowledge to cover all available LZs with manpads forces us to drive into combat and then they will engage our guys while they're mounted so they can't get out and get into the fight.

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  2. Summed Up: Firepower doesn't fix everything

    Another point: confusion regarding Light Infantry - some people think Light Infantry is equipment/weapons/armor, or lack thereof. In other words, light infantry means they are unencumbered by heavy armor, weapons, etc.

    Others think it is a question of non-linear, unconventional tactics.

    I tend to think of it is as the latter, hearkening back to Jager infantry who were not "line infantry" and had more freedom of movement and independence as to how to engage the enemy with an emphasis on surprise, stealth, indirect.

    Which definition are you using re: light infantry?

    I don't think the US has any light infantry any longer. Yeah, some say, "look at the the Rangers", but when was the last time the Rangers did anything without vehicles? Fast roping from Blackhawks/dropped off by Chinooks/parachuted from C17s/ride in MRAPS doesn't count as light infantry. They are chauffeured doorkickers ad you can't surprise someone with turbine engines and rotors.

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    1. Blasphemy! If firepower don't fix your thing... you need more firepower! ;D

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    2. hmmm. i was using light infantry in the term of the old 25th ID from the 1990's. they were the closest thing the US has ever had to the Jager Infantry that I can think of. traditional Rangers fit the bill too but they've been bastardized by SOCOM and the SEAL, kick every door mentality. quite honestly they've probably lost a step when it comes to pure infantry skills.

      additionally i used (and thanks for catching me) mech infantry in the Marine Corps way of war because i believe thats where we can truly shine in the fights (in my mind) that are coming.

      but in summation. no. by your definition we haven't had true light infantry formations for over 25 years.

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    3. yeah, when was the last time any Ranger unit did a 20km footborne raid? *crickets*

      I keep seeing Youtube vids units of Western units driving or arriving via rotary wing at a location, then being fired on from at least three direction, sometimes even surrounded, and then they call in airstrikes to get out of the snare they are in. How can you expect to surprise an enemy if you rely on engines?

      Of course, when you saddle a trooper with 50kgs of gear and place him in an environment that is 110 in the shade and 10000ft, are we surprised they need to ride in MRAPs and Chinooks?

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    4. Yep. The real problem is the kitchen-sink mentality that says every soldier needs to carry an 80lb pack into combat. Light infantry needs to travel um... LIGHT!

      It's the same mentality that has bloated up the requirements for the F-35 and other weapons programs.

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  3. Re: #2, saying that the IDF naval gun fire had less than desirable results is an understatement. As an FYI, the naval gun fire was a slight shift in the wind away from blowing up the main hotel that all the reporters are staying in. Vice actually has a video of it as they were shooting film at the time, part of their Rockets and Revenge series on the conflict (which is actually rather good if you haven't seen it). The Naval shell looked like it was about 30-40 feet from actually hitting the hotel, which would of had super major implications for the IDF as in: breaking news, IDF kills/injures 90% of reporters on the conflict.

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    1. FYI, here's the video queued up to the hotel near miss: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=ssoZUSOgELk#t=610

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