Monday, January 14, 2019

Canadian TAPV suffering high rate of rollovers and fires...




via National Post.
The Canadian Army’s new armoured vehicles have been plagued by rollovers and fires, the latest in a series of problems to affect the $600-million fleet.

Since April 2014, there have been 10 incidents when Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles have tipped on to their sides, six where they have rolled over completely, and four where they have caught fire.

Pat Finn, the assistant deputy minister in charge of procurement at the Department of National Defence, told Postmedia there have been no serious injuries as a result of the incidents. But the problems are not the first to hit the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles or TAPVs.

The TAPV program has “experienced a number of significant technical issues, particularly affecting vehicle mobility,” then-defence minister Rob Nicholson was told in August 2014. There have been problems with the suspension, steering and other items on the vehicle, according to a briefing document released under the Access to Information law.

The technical issues significantly delayed the test program for the vehicles, the document added. “These accumulating incidents, which relate to the vehicle’s ability to travel distances on medium cross country terrain, led the project office to conclude the existing testing could no longer continue.”

The Conservative government announced the TAPV contract in 2012 as part of its re-equipping of the Canadian Army. Canada bought 500 TAPVs from Textron, a U.S.-based defence firm, at a cost of $603 million. The TAPV is a wheeled combat vehicle that will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, and armoured transport of personnel and equipment.

Finn said as a result of the various incidents further quality assurance tests are being done. “It’s kind of high off the ground so it can be more agile,” he explained about the vehicle. “(But) it brings with it a high centre of gravity.”

“It may be it’s about training and understanding the vehicle,” Finn added.

None of the vehicles have been written off because of the incidents, according to the Canadian Army. “Upon review of the major TAPV incidents, it has been identified that the most common contributing factors of these incidents tends to be human error due to limited familiarity time operating the vehicles,” the army noted in an emailed statement to Postmedia.

The army pointed out that investigations into the incidents did not reveal any design or mechanical faults. “Primary reports on the majority of these incidents (rollover and tip-overs) were attributed to a combination of factors, such as operator experience, the vehicle’s high centre of gravity, weather conditions, and/or vehicle speed,” the email noted.

The army did not provide any explanation for the four fires on the TAPVs.

The army noted that it is considering limits on the speeds the vehicles can operate at as well as “rollover hazard mitigations” and “recommendations such as the use of new technology to enhance experience for new drivers and crew.”

The army did not provide further details on those new technologies or initiatives.

The TAPV project will cost taxpayers a total of $1.2 billion, which not only includes the vehicles but also includes the building of infrastructure to house them, as well as the purchase of ammunition and service support for the equipment.

The initial problems with steering and other issues delayed the delivery of the vehicles. After those were dealt with, the army had to contend last year with concerns about brakes and the distance the vehicles needed to stop. The TAPV is a heavy vehicle and requires longer stopping distances at higher speeds than most new drivers are familiar with, noted DND spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier in July 2018.

The fleet of TAPVs have been distributed across seven bases and 24 units throughout Canada. The Canadian army has said it expects to declare full operational capability by mid-2020, following training of all operators. TAPVs were first deployed in spring 2017 to assist communities affected by the flooding in Quebec.
This is (in my opinion) an issue of driver training first and foremost.  If you ain't used to driving a high center of gravity vehicle...especially over rough terrain, then you're gonna see stuff like this.

That explains the rollovers.

The vehicle fires?

I have no clue.

Either way I'm a fan of the TAPV and know that it will serve the Canadians well.  Hopefully they get this sorted out quickly.  If they do then this bargain priced acquisition will live up to its potential.

More Tornado farewell pics (low level)...

The Twitter-verse is getting geared up big time for the Tornado farewell.  I'm starting to see more and more pics of the Tornado in its natural element...Low & Fast!  It's a glorious send off for a great plane...





Rest In Peace, Mr. Overton, Sir!!!


God Bless!

Wish I could have talked to you in this life.  Bet you had some stories to tell! Maybe I'll get a chance in the next one...have a sip of the Makers Mark and relax a while...we either got this or we don't but you damn sure did your part...

Monday Motivation...


Open Comment Post. 14 Jan 2019


Sunday, January 13, 2019

Aviation guys to the front. Is this impressive or what? F-35 partial practice demo released by 56th Fighter Wing...



I don't know enough to know if this is impressive but I have to give credit where it's due.

It looked good to me.

Didn't think an F-35 could do that.  Climbing straight up in afterburner?  Yeah, that's kinda ordinary especially with reduced payload and fuel (which I assume is all part of ALL demos). 

What has me wondering is the "controlled fall" (don't know what else to call it...popular media would say that its a prelude to a flat spin) that the bubba seemed to be in complete control of.

But like I said.  I don't know enough to know.  So all the aviation dudes in the class to the front.

Is this partial demo impressive or what?

Artist impression of the new Project 20386 Corvette for the Russian Navy via Navy Recognition...


CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, Avalanche aboard Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) VILLE DE QUEBEC is put thru its paces...





How the Air Force Lost Its Way By Jerry Hendrix


via National Review...
The Air Force once understood its purpose with stark clarity. In the first half of the 20th century, air-power advocates continually stressed the importance of bypassing tactical skirmishes and penetrating to the enemy’s vital centers to coerce either the foreign government or its population to submit. Independent air forces in Great Britain and Italy focused their procurement efforts on larger and longer-range heavy bombers. Non-independent air forces, such as the U.S. Army Air Corps, sought the same even as their parent service (the U.S. Army, in the American case) pressed them to buy tactical aircraft and perform direct-combat air-support missions for ground infantry and armor units. This made some sense during World War II, when long-range bombers found themselves in need of fighter escorts to fend off enemy fighters and establish temporary air dominance for the bombers to get through to their targets. But after the war, science and engineering combined to alter circumstances.

The jet engines that came to dominate aircraft design during the early years of the Cold War changed the nature of force employment, as jet fighters no longer had the range to escort the jet bombers of the newly established and very powerful Strategic Air Command to targets inside the Soviet Union. Fighters then became specialized for air-defense and air-dominance missions within a radius of a couple of hundred miles of fighter bases. Strategic Air Command bombers, which numbered in the thousands, soon began to specialize themselves, evolving towards designs that could fly higher and faster in order to penetrate Soviet air defenses. The Soviets responded by building new surface-to-air missiles and high-altitude/high-speed interceptors to rob American bombers of their advantages. It was only at the end of the Cold War, with the introduction of the stealth B-2 Spirit bomber, that bombers regained the upper hand in the U.S.–USSR strategic competition. But by then, the Strategic Air Command had been disestablished, and the Air Force felt that its mission had changed.

The change began during the Vietnam War, in which fighters flying from land bases in South Vietnam were loaded up with bombs to hit land targets in North Vietnam and along supply routes in neighboring countries. The improved accuracy of smaller aircraft carrying lighter loads of bombs and providing combat air support to American ground forces in direct contact with the enemy began to subtly alter the internal culture of the Air Force. The bomber “tribe,” based in the politically powerful Strategic Air Command, had supplied six of the first ten Air Force chiefs of staff, but it began to lose influence within the service to the fighter “tribe.” In the 36 years since Chief of Staff Lew Allen Jr. retired, no bomber pilot has occupied that office, and the Air Force’s inventory of bombers has shrunk from over 10,000 aircraft during the 1950s to fewer than 200 today. Fighter pilots gained ascendency based upon the assumptions of access to bases within range of their enemies, the ability of their supporting tanker force to survive, and the greater importance of air supremacy than long-range-strike capability.

Air supremacy is a straightforward concept. It seeks a degree of superiority over an opposing air force such that the enemy is incapable of effective interference with friendly aircraft or ground and naval forces. This definition of air superiority held for regional wars such as those in Vietnam, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq (both times), and Afghanistan (where the enemy had no opposing air power to speak of). Air Force theorists also state that air superiority applies to theater campaigns (those that range across an entire region of the globe), enabling larger aircraft, cargo haulers, refueling tankers, and bombers to operate freely — except when they cannot, and that is where the modern United States Air Force lost its way.
Story here. 

Hendrix is right but he's wrong too.

Right when talking about the Fighter Mafia taking control of the USAF.  Wrong when he tries to talk about the reason why.

What did he miss?

He missed the reality of America's wars for the past half century.  America has been involved in a continuing small wars cycle for as long as I can remember.  Because past Air Force leadership was so wedded to the idea of the Strategic Air Command being only useful for nuclear strike they were late to the party to providing support for the kind of wars America was involved in.

Because they were late and so singularly focused they were slow to pickup on the changing nature of hot wars, the politics of denuclearization and almost impotent when Air Force reorganization gave power to the part of the force that was most involved in the fighting.

When did this happen?

By my reckoning shortly after Vietnam and hit warp speed when the USSR fell.

What I find astonishing is the bare facts of things. 

One squadron of B-52's or B-1's can provide all the support that the ground forces need in say Afghanistan.  Not only would it be less costly but a couple of plains loitering over the country carry a reasonable load of precision munitions would see as good if not better performance than their fighter brothers can provide.

The Air Force has lost its way but it's because US policy makers don't know what they're doing or how they want to do it.

82nd Airborne (along with their new LAVs) practice "water gap" crossings...pics by Sgt. Gin-Sophie De Bellotte









Wonder why the Army/82nd isn't taking advantage of their swim capabilities?